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A FEMINIST UNDERSTANDING OF 

SEX-SELECTIVE ABORTION: 

SOLELY A MATTER OF CHOICE? 

April L. Cherry* 
I. lNTRODUCI'ION 
Demographers of international population trends have found 
that adults prefer male offspring.1 This desire for male children is 
currently being realized by the use of both pre-conception and post­
conception sex-selective reproductive techniques and technologies. 
While there are many ways for a woman to attempt to select the 
sex of her child before conception,2 there are essentially two proce­
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Cline, Donna Christie, Tanya Hernandez, and Denise Morgan for their helpful sug­
gestions; Timothy Schardl and Amy Ray for their excellent research, critical analysis 
and editing skills; Gail Crawford and Marla Butler for their help in finalizing the 
draft; and Elzy Williams for her superb typing of the manuscript. Moreover, I would 
like to thank Florida State University College of Law for its summer research grant 
which made this work financially possible. And last but certainly not least, I would 
like to thank Andre Taylor, Laura, Pamela, Joyce and Aaron Cherry who cared for my 
babies so their mama could get her work done. Of course any errors in this work are 
mine alone. 
I. NANCY E. WilLIAMSON, SoNs OR DAUGHTERS: A CRoss-CuLTURAL SURVEY OF PA­
RENTAL PREFERENCES (1976); Sanford Winston, Birth Control and: the Sex-Ratio at Birth, 
38 AM.J. OF Soc. 225 (1933). Preference for male children is not quite universal. For 
example, among some societies in New Guinea, female children are more highly val­
ued than male children. MARGARET MEAD, SEX AND TEMPERAMENT IN THREE PRIMITIVE 
SOCIETIES 171 (1963). 
2. The medical advice is varied on pre-conception sex-selective techniques. For 
those who are uncomfortable with sex-selective abortion, but still want a male child, 
bookstores are filled with "how-to books" designed to help couples procure a male 
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<lures now used which can positively identify the sex of the fetus after 
conception: chorionic villi sampling (CVS),3 and the most popular 
technique - amniocentesis.4 After identifying the sex of the fetus, 
the fetus may be aborted for the purpose of sex-selection. 
child. The techniques usually suggested include advice on the timing of intercourse 
with respect to ovulation, douching, shallow versus deep penetration of the penis, as 
well as advice regarding whether or not the woman should have an orgasm. See, e.g., 
LANDRUM B. SHETILES & DAVID M. RoVIK, How TO CHOOSE THE SEX OF YoUR BABY 
(1989); TRACEY HoTCHNER, PREGNANCY AND CHll.DBIRTH: THE COMPLETE GUIDE FOR A 
NEW LIFE 35-37 (1984); M. Ruth Nentwig, Technical Aspects of Sex Preselection, in THE 
CusroM MADE CHn.o?: WOMEN-CENTERED PERSPECTIVES 181, 183-84 (Helen B. 
Holmes et al. eds., 1981); Nancy E. Williamson, Buys or Girls? Parent's Preferences and 
Sex Contro~ 33 POPULATION Buu. l, 18-21 (Jan. 1978) [hereinafter Buys or Girls?]. An­
other popular pre-conception sex selection technique employed by fertility clinics is 
the separation of androgenic and gynogenic sperm. Nentwig, supra, at 183-84. One 
such separation method is differential centrifugation. This process separates the an­
drogenic and gynogenic sperm, which can then be artificially inseminated in a wo­
man. In some clinics the gynogenic sperm are destroyed after the separating process. 
Thus, in these clinics, only couples wanting to insure the birth of a male child can be 
serviced. Id. at 181, 182-83. Another sperm separation technique differentiates an­
drogenic from gynogenic sperm by their mobility. The faster swimming androgenic 
sperm are separated from the slower moving gynogenic sperm. Id. at 183. This pro­
cedure is said to have an approximately 80 percent success rate for women wanting 
male children. See, e.g., Stephen L. Corson et al., Sex Selection by Sperm Separation and 
Insemination, 42 FERTILITY & STERILTIY 756, 759 (1984). For a description of other 
methods of sex selection, see Betty B. Hoskins & Helen B. Holmes, Technowgy and 
Prenatal Femicide, in TEST TUBE WOMEN 237, 238-39 (Rita Arditti et al. eds., 1989). 
3. Chorionic villi sampling is a procedure conducted during the first trimester of 
a woman's pregnancy. A suction tube is inserted through the cervix (or less often 
through the abdominal wall} which aspirates sloughed fetal cells. The DNA of the 
cells is examined for indication of the fetus' sex. See Hoskins & Holmes, supra note 2, 
at 241-42. This test may be performed in the ninth to eleventh weeks of the preg­
nancy. Aliza Kolker & B. Merideth Burke, Deciding About the Unknown: Perceptions of 
Risk ofWomen Who Have Prenatal Diagnosis, 20 WOMEN & HEALTH 37, 38 (1993); see also 
Aliza Kolker et al., Attitudes About Abortion of Women Who Undergo Prenatal Diagnosis, 9 
REs. IN Soc. OF HEALTH CARE 49, 52 (1991). Thus, ifan abortion is performed, it can 
be performed in the first trimester when the physical risks, and perhaps the emo­
tional trauma, is lower or reduced. The procedure carries a risk of miscarriage "from 
less than 1 percent in some centers to 10 percent or higher in others, depending on 
the physicians'experience with the procedure." Kolker & Burke, supra, at 38; see also 
Nentwig, supra note 2, at 185. Also, first trimester abortions are more readily available 
and less expensive than second trimester abortions. Thus, CVS done for sex identifi­
cation purposes permits abortions done for the purpose of sex-selection to be less 
emotionally traumatic for the women and provides greater access to women who wish 
to abort their fetuses for the purpose of sex-selection. 
4. Frances E. Kobrin & Robert G. Porter, Jr., Sex Selection through Amniocentesis and 
Selective Abortion, in SEX SELECTION OF CHll.DREN 47, 47-48 (Neil G. Bennett ed., 1983). 
Amniocentesis is usually used to determine whether the fetus has chromosomal ab­
normalities, metabolic abnormalities, or neural tube defects. It is also used when 
medically indicated to determine the sex of the fetus in order to diagnose the possibil­
ity of certain sex-linked diseases. Id. 
Amniocentesis can be performed any time between the fourteenth and twentieth 
week of pregnancy. It usually takes about four weeks for the physician to receive the 
results from the laboratory. In amniocentesis, a needle is inserted into the amniotic 
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Currently two states have prohibited the use of abortion for the 
purpose of sex-selection: Pennsylvania and Illinois.5 Under Penn­
sylvania's statute, no abortion is to be performed except by a physician 
after either: "I) She determines that, in her best clinical judgment, 
the abortion is necessary; or 2) She receives what she reasonably be­
lieves to be a written statement signed by another physician ... certify­
ing ... that the abortion is necessary. "6 Further, the statute provides 
that "[i]n determining ... whether an abortion is necessary, a physi­
cian's best clinical judgment may be exercised in light of all factors 
(physical, emotional, psychological, familial and the woman's age) rel­
evant to the well-being of the woman. No abortion which is sought 
solely because of the sex of the unborn child shall be deemed a neces­
sary abortion."7 
Illinois' abortion law also prohibits sex-selective abortion. The 
statute does not include a requirement that the physician find the 
abortion to be "necessary," as in Pennsylvania; rather, it prohibits 
aborting viable fetuses,8 and abortions which are performed "with 
knowledge that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely on 
account of the sex of the fetus."9 In addition, subsection (8) provides 
that this prohibition shall not be construed to proscribe the perform-
cavity which surrounds the developing fetus. Amniotic fluid is removed and analyzed 
by the karyotypic technique, which provides the physician "with genetic information 
regarding the fems. Amniotic fluid cells cultivated in this manner have been shown 
to successfully predict the sex of the fems/infant in 99.93 percent of the cases studied. 
M.S. Golbus et al., Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis in 3000 Amniocenteses, 300 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 157, 162-64 (1979), cited in Kobrin & Potter, supra, at 47. The risk ofmiscarriage 
as a result of the procedure is between .005 and .01 percent, see Kolker et al., supra 
note 3, at 51, and the trauma of losing a pregnancy in the second trimester is well 
documented: "[b]y that stage in the pregnancy the fetus has a social as well as a 
physical and emotional reality.••• Neither the fetus' life, its death, nor the parents' 
participation in that death can be denied," id.; see also Susan Hodge, Waitingfor Amni­
ocentesis, 320 NEW ENG.J. MED. 63, 63-64 (1989). Fetal sex can also be determined by 
the use of ultrasonic scanning during the third trimester. Because third trimester 
abortions are often prohibited by state statute, this method is not used for the pur­
pose of sex-selection. See generally MARY ANNE WARREN, GENDERCIDE: THE IMPLICA­
TIONS OF SEX SELECTION 7 (1985). 
5. Cf. The Abortion Act 1967 (Great Britain) as amended, does not permit the 
termination ofpregnancy solely on the grounds offetal sex. As a result of the passage 
by Parliament of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990 (HFE Act), the 
Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority has sought to determine whether pre­
conception or pre-implantation techniques for sex-selection are "necessary or desira­
ble" for social or medical reasons in order to determine whether to grant licenses to 
centers providing these services. HUMAN FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYOLOGY AUTHORITY, 
SEX SELECTION: PUBuc CONSULTATION DOCUMENT 5 (Great Britain 1993). 
6. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN.§ 3204(a) (1983). 
7. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3204(c) (1994). 
8. Iu.. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 510/5 (Smith-Hurd 1993). 
9. Iu.. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 510/8 {Smith-Hurd 1993). 
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ance of an abortion on account of the sex of the fetus because of a 
genetic disorder linked to that sex.10 
While there are millions of abortions performed each year in the 
United States,11 relatively few appear to be performed for sex-selective 
purposes. Although the number of sex-selective abortions is almost 
impossible to determine because women are not required to disclose 
why they are choosing abortion, one 1988 survey of obstetrician/gyne­
cologists suggests that approximately 100 abortions for sex-selection 
are performed each year in the United States.12 
Although seemingly small numbers of abortions are performed 
for the purpose of sex-selection, sex-selective abortion nevertheless 
presents important questions in the development of feminist thinking 
about abortion rights. Sex-selective abortion challenges feminist 
thinking with regard to the development of new methods or strategies 
for extending women's freedom and autonomy. Sex-selective abor­
tion highlights weaknesses in choice rhetoric. Furthermore, the prob­
lem of sex-selective abortion demonstrates the importance of 
continuing feminist critique of whether the doctrines of choice and 
privacy, in the area of reproductive rights, empower women or allow 
men or the state to secure their own misogynist, familial, or popula­
tion control agendas. 
Often the issue of abortion is framed as a feminist issue of choice 
and respect for women's bodily integrity. Under this rubric, a woman 
chooses whether or not to have an abortion, at least until the point of 
fetal viability. Her decision may be based on her private circum­
stances, so she need not give any reason for requesting an abortion. 
10. Id. For a further discussion of legislative proposals regarding sex-selective 
abortion, see Owen D. Jones, Sex Selection: Regulating Technol.ogy Enabling The Predetenni­
nation ofa Ghil.d's Gender, 6 HAR.v.J. L. & TECH. 1 (1992); George Schedler, Benign Sex 
Discrimination Revisited: Constitutional and Mural Issues in Banning Sex-Selection Aburtion, 
15 PEPP. L. REv. 295, 296-97 (1988); John Schaibley, Sex Selection Aburtion: A Constitu­
tional Analyru of the Aburtion Liherty and A Person's Ri.ght to Know, 56 IND. L. J. 281 
(1981). 
11. In 1988 there were approximately 1.59 million legal abortions performed. 
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 83 (1993). 
12. USA Today on TV (WINH television broadcast, Feb. 7, 1989). It is interesting 
that although ten percent of geneticists and physicians in a survey stated that they 
were willing to perform an abortion based on sex-selection, the number of acknowl­
edged abortions for sex-selection purposes is quite low. Id. One physician, Dr. Haig 
H. Kazazian, at the Johns Hopkins Hospital, which performs sex selection abortions 
with mandatory counseling, suggests that American women are not willing to take the 
risks necessary in a second trimester abortion in order to choose the sex of their 
child: 
[T]he clinic has not experienced an increase in requests for sex selection, 
and it has not yet terminated a pregnancy for sex selection alone. Our over­
all experience during the past eight years leads us to believe that couples 
desiring sex selection who are willing to undergo midtrimester abortion are 
uncommon in American society. 
Haig H. Kazazian,Jr., A Medical View, 10 HAsr!NGs CENTER REP. 17, 18 (Feb. 1980). 
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Many feminists have supported sex-selective abortion in these terms, 
viewing any restriction regarding pre-viability access to abortion as 
working against the goal of equality for women. For example, 
although feminist ethicist Tabitha Powledge understands that in the 
context of sex-selection of children, "to prefer males is, unavoidably, 
to denigrate females,"13 she nevertheless takes the position vis-a-vis 
sex-selection that 
[i]mprovements in the position ofwomen depend on women being 
able to obtain abortions without needing to justify their deci.Sions to 
anyone but themselves. Restrictions retard that goal. . . . [T] o pre­
serve what improvements in their lot women have achieved, society 
should seek no legal restrictions on reproductive freedom, even on 
a technology that will be used selectively against females. I recog­
nize its irony, but view this position as part of the price of furthering 
the goal of equal treatment.14 
Thus, the substantive outcome is subordinated to process neutral­
ity. In this instance process neutrality is embodied in the abstract 
moral and legal concepts of "choice" and "privacy," which are derived 
from a male-dominated tradition of classical liberalism. Classical lib­
eralism assumes that all citizens have a zone of liberty in which to 
make intimate decisions. While liberalism protects individuals from 
unwarranted government intrusion into decisions regarding the pri­
vate sphere, it does not require nor encourage individuals to behave 
in ways that further the interests of the community. Nor does it pro­
mote women's interests in equality.15 Thus, by focusing on the pro­
cess of whether bodily integrity and liberty are protected, feminists 
like Powledge fail to pay close attention to the substantive outcome ­
the abortion of female fetuses. 
The dilemma, of course, is that feminism has traditionally 
s_tressed the importance of women's control over their bodies and re­
productive control in achieving social, political, and economic equal­
ity.16 Sex-selective abortion, like other "new" reproductive 
technologies, challenges this traditional liberal feminist position. The 
effects of an individual woman's use of the technology goes beyond 
herself. The technology affects women as a social class. In the case of 
sex-selective abortion, "the paradox posed by individual choices even­
tually alter[s] every woman's experience of maternity and mother­
13. Tabitha Powledge, Toward A Maral Policy for Sex Choice, in SEx SELECTION OF 
CHILDREN, supra note 4, at 201, 206. 
14. Id. at 207. 
15. As Janice Raymond has noted, "[c]hoice resonates as a quintessential U.S. 
value, set in a context of a social history that has gradually allowed all sorts of oppres­
sive so-called options, such as prostitution [and] pornography, .•. to be defended in 
the name of women's right to choose." JANICE RAYMOND, WOMEN As WoMBs ix-x 
(1993). 
16. ROSALIND POLI.ACK PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE: THE STATE, 
SEXUALITY AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 289-302 (1985). 
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hood."17 Feminists must be circumspect and cautiously evaluate the 
social, political, and economic forces that constrain women's "free 
choice" and the technical means heralded as liberating their choice. 
Liberal individualism, then, may be unhelpful when dealing with the 
issue of sex-selective abortion, because ultimately, the use of sex-selec­
tive abortion will determine whether women will exist.18 
I imagine that some conservatives may fear sex-selective tech­
niques, in the power and control ofwomen, because these techniques 
can be used to threaten male power and the existence of men. Thus, 
conservatives may fear the use of such powerful tools for the actual 
benefit ofwomen. Such apprehension is in opposition to reality. Wo­
men do not have control of the technology, and because women lack 
real social, political or economic power, sex-selective technologies, in­
cluding abortion, are being used to annihilate women before they are 
born. Women are therefore being required to participate in their 
own pre-victimization 19 through the use of sex-selective techniques 
which ensure the birth of male children. 
This essay consists of five sections. The first section describes the 
problem of sex-selective abortion, including an analysis of sociological 
data regarding adult preference for male children and its current ef­
fects. In Section Two, I discuss various philosophical paradigms and 
analyses of sex-selective abortion with the goal of developing a coher­
ent philosophical base from which to argue for a policy regarding sex­
selective abortion which furthers the goals of gender equality. Be­
cause of the importance of the context of women's lives in the 
modified pragmatist analysis, I believe that a modified pragmatic phil­
osophical approach is best suited to the task.20 Section Three ad­
dresses the constitutionality of sex-selective abortion prohibitions in 
light of the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.21 In Section Four, I outline the lib­
eral feminist response to sex-selective abortion and address the inade­
quacy of traditional legal doctrines to deal with the issue. Finally, in 
Section Five, I propose a feminist treatment of sex-selective abortion. 
My construction of a radical feminist analysis moves away from a view 
of the procedure as one of individual choice, and acknowledges sex­
selection as an issue affecting women as a class. I place the decision 
whether to abort on the basis of gender clearly within the feminist 
dilemma of double-bind choices. 
17. Laura R Woliver, The Deflective Power ofReproductive Technologies: The Impact on 
Women, 9 WOMEN AND PoL. 17, 19-20 (1989). 
18. See Helen B. Holmes and Betty B. Hoskins, Prenatal and Preconception Sex 
Choice Technologies: A Path to Femicide? in MAN-MADE WOMEN, supra note 25, at 1, 25. 
19. Janice Raymond, Introduction, in THE CusroM-MAoE CHILD?, supra note 2, at 
177, 177. 
20. See discussion infra at pp. 181-87. 
21. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
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My purpose is not necessarily to suggest a model of law reform. 
As Powledge and others have noted, law reform or other types of gov­
ernment intervention may, under the current political climate and 
conditions of oppression, further jeopardize the abortion right. 22 In­
stead, my principal goal is to present a prologue for the consideration 
of the role of law in organizing these relationships. I wish to develop a 
feminist analysis23of sex-selective abortion which acknowledges the 
failures of both traditional privacy an_d equal protection doctrine to 
expose the victimization ofwomen in the reproductive context, which 
recognizes the needs of women with regard to the sexual composi­
tions of their families, and which questions why women are required 
to pay the price for "balanced" families by jeopardizing their emo­
tional and physical health. Above all, it is my intention to focus on the 
issue of reproductive justice.24 As social psychologist Robyn Rowland 
22. See Powledge, supra note 13, at 206; see also Hoskins & Holmes, supra note 2, 
at 245. 
23. Political theorist and feminist scholar bell hooks has described feminism as 
"a commitment to eradicating the ideology of domination that permeates Western 
culture on various levels - sex, race, and class, to name a few - and a commitment 
to reorganizing U.S. society so that self-development of people can take precedence." 
BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN: BIACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 194-95 (1981). In her 
work, Mary Anne Warren describes what it means to write from a feminist perspective: 
This book is written from a feminist perspective. To say this is not to admit a 
bias, but to declare a belief in certain facts that I hold to be objectively de­
monstrable, and certain values I regard as morally essential. The basic em­
pirical belief that unites all feminists is that women of many societies have 
been and still are severely oppressed because of their sex. The basic moral 
belief is that this oppression is wrong and must be ended. 
WARREN, supra note 4, at 2-3. I wish to develop a critique which takes the experiences 
ofwomen seriously and focuses more on the impact of this technology and the policy 
surrounding the technology on women (as engendered as a socially ,constructed 
group) and less on the issue of individual choice as it is understood by many liberals, 
including liberal feminists. 
24. Although I am concentrating exclusively on the issue of abortion, there are 
other reproductive rights that are vital to women ifwe are to achieve equality and 
reproductive justice, and accordingly, self-determination. These issues include the 
right to have children, i.e., the right not to be sterilized without informed consent. 
See, e.g., Madrigal v. Quilligan, No. CV75-2057 (G.D. Cal. June 30, 1978), aff'd, 639 
F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1981); Adele Clark, Subtle Forms ofSterilization Abuse: A Reproductive 
Rights Analysis, in TEST TUBE WOMEN, supra note 2, at 188; ANGEIA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, 
RACE, AND CIASs (1983); Susan E. Davis, Contraception, Abortion, and Sterilization Today: 
What Choices do Women Really Have?, in WOMEN UNDER ATTACK! VICTORIES BACKIASH 
AND THE FIGHT FOR REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 15-30 (Susan E. Davis ed., 1988); Carlos 
Velez, Se Me Acab6 La Candon: An Ethnography ofNon-Consenting Sterilizations Among 
Mexican American Women in Los Angeles, in MExlCAN WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 71 
(Magdelena Mora & Adelaida R Del Castillo eds., 1980). 
These issues also include the right to be free from forced medical treatment 
while pregnant. See e.g., In re A.G., 573 A.2d 1235 (1990) (en bane) (recognizing 
mother's right to bodily integrity as against state's right to protect fetus); In re Ja­
maica Hospital, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1985); Raleigh Fitkin v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 
(NJ. 1964); George Annas, Forced Cesareans: The Most Unkindest Cut ofAll, 12 liAsTINGS 
CENTER REP., June 1982, at 16-17, 45 (1982); Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions and 
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noted: "We need to challenge our own thinking and the current tech­
nology without eroding the hard-won gains we have made in repro­
ductive choice. In the end, does the new technology mean a transfer 
of power to women as a social group?"25 
I. SOCIOLOGICAL DATA: DEMOGRAPHICS AND PREDICTIONS 
Daughters and dead fish are no keeping wares. 

- 18th Century English proverb 

A gfrl lets you down twice, once at birth and the second time 

when she marries. 

- A common Korean saying 

Demographers have reported that there are 100 million women 
missing from the world's population.26 According to United Nations' 
estimates, there were only 987 females for every 1,000 males in 1990. 
The crisis is much more severe among female children than among 
adult women. Fewer and fewer female children are being born.27 
Although the popular media in the United States would have us be­
lieve that these "missing girls" are solely a "third world" or non-West­
ern problem,28 the shortage of girl children is as severe in Western 
"developed" nations as it is in the "developing" world. Although in 
1990, the "developing" world had approximately 954 girls (nineteen 
years old and younger) for every 1000 boys, the "developed" world 
had only 952 girls for every 1000 boys. While much of the social com­
mentary on these "missing" women has focused on "son fixation"29 of 
South Asian, particularly Indian, culture, the demographics indicate 
that Western nations, including the United States, are also involved in 
producing this precarious and "unnatural" condition of world-wide 
sex ratios. 
Interoentions: Whats Wrong with Fetal Rights, IO HAR.v. WoMEN's LJ. 9 (1987). See gener­
ally Gayle Binion, Reproductive Freedom and the Constitution: The Limits on Choice, 4 
BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 12 (1988). 
25. Robyn Rowland, Motherhood, Patriarchal Power, Alienation and the Issue of 
'Choice' in Sex Presekction, in MAN-MADE WOMEN 74, 86 (Gena Corea et al. eds., 1987). 
26. Amartya Sen, More than 100 Million Women Are Missing, N.Y. REv. BooKS 61 
(Dec. 20, 1990); Nicholas D. Kristof, Stark Data On Women: 100 Million Are Missing, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1991, at Cl; Irene Sege, The Grim Mystery of the Worlds Missing 
Women, BosroN GLOBE, Feb. 3, 1992, at 25. 
27. The normal ratio of women to men is 1:1. The Worlds Women, 1970-1990, 
Statistical Office ofU.N.'s Secretariat, U.N., Series K, No. 6, at 13 (1991). The biologi­
cal normal sex ratio at birth is 105 or 106 boys for every 100 girls born. Susan Green­
halgh & Jiali Li, Engendering Reproductive Policy and Practice in Peasant China: For a 
Feminist Demography ofReproduction, 20 SIGNS 601, 601 (1995). 
28. See, e.g., Jo McGowan, In India, They Abort Females, NEWSWEEK, January 30, 
1989 at 17; Steven R. Weisman, No More Guarantees ofa Sons Birth, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 
1988, at Al. (Both Articles discuss amniocentesis for the purpose of sex-selection as a 
problem in India, with no mention of the phenomenon in the Western World.) 
29. Nera Kuckreja Sohoni, Where Are the Girls?, Ms., July-Aug. 1994, at 96. 
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The focus of social commentators on sex-selection in non-West­
ern cultures is due in part to the West's understanding of religious, 
cultural and economic factors in those cultures which make the birth 
of sons crucial. For example, post-conception sex-selective techniques 
are used quite frequently among the well-educated in countries such 
as South Korea and China, where there is a strong commitment to the 
Confucian dictate that only men can perform the required rites of 
ancestorworship.30 There is also evidence that in the People's Repub­
lic of China the policy of encouraging couples to have only one child 
has led to greatly decreasing numbers of female children being born 
and ofwomen in society as a whole.31 In India, the prevalence ofpost­
conception sex-selective techniques is understood in the context of 
the cultural tradition of dowry, which causes daughters to be enor­
mous economic hardships, and in which an unmarried daughter is a 
negative "social stigma."32 Also, many Indian girls face female infanti­
cide and the discriminatory allocation of food and health care.33 
30. Neil G. Bennett, Sex Selection of Children: An Overview, in SEX SELECTION OF 
CHILDREN, supra note 4, at 8, 9; Alison Dundes Renteln, Sex Selection and Reproductive 
Freedom, 15 WOMEN'S Sruo. INT'L F. 405, 410-11 (1992). 
31. Greenhalgh & Ll, supra note 27, at 601. In fact, between 1982 and 1989 the 
number of boys born per 100 girls rose from 107 to 114, well above the biological 
normal level of 105 to 106. Id. For third or higher-order children the ratio of boys to 
girls exceeds 125. Id. As Greenhalgh and Ll note, these "numbers tell a frightening 
story: little girls are being eliminated from Chinese society ... the largest society on 
earth - on a massive scale." Id. 
32. Dowry is defined as the property that a woman brings to her husband when 
she marries. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 443 (5th ed. 1979). Although the dowry has 
been outlawed in India by the Central Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961, it is still quite 
prevalent. See Weisman, supra note 26, at Al. In fact, it seems as if the size of the 
dowries that are demanded by the bridegroom and his family are growing rapidly. Id. 
atA9. One reporter noted that "dowries as high as $10,000 are common among fami­
lies who earn that kind ofmoney in a year's work." Id. As a response to the continued 
prevalence of dowry, the Indian Parliament amended the dowry Prohibition Act in 
1984, to introduce more stringent penalties for the giving and taking ofdowry. Indira 
Jaising, Violence Against Women: The Indian Perspective, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN 
RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERsPECTIVES 51, 54 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper 
eds., 1995). Nevertheless, daughters continue to be a severe economic hardship and 
because unmarried daughters are viewed with scorn, there continues to exist great 
cultural and economic incentives for families to severely limit the number of female 
children they have. Id. 
33. Viola Roggencamp, Abortion of a Special Kind: Male Sex Selection in India, in 
TEST TUBE WOMEN, supra note 2, at 267; Williamson, Boys or Girls?, supra note 2, at 9­
10; see also Austin Hughes, Female Infanticide: Sex Ratio Manipulation in Humans, 2 
ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 109, 110-11 (1981) (recognizing existence of differential 
female infanticide through neglect of female infants). Under these circumstances, 
sex-selective abortion becomes an attractive, viable, and rational solution for those 
who can afford it! (On rationality see Elster, infra note 59). See Madhu Kishwar, The 
Continuing Defidt of Women in India and the Impact ofAmniocentesis, in MAN-MADE WO­
MEN, supra note 25, at 32. Mothers under these circumstances can also be understood 
as fulfilling their maternal duties of care. Just as African-American slave mothers were 
understood as protecting their children from the cruelty of slavery through infanti­
cide, women under these conditions can be understood as protecting their potential 
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Some girls and women are killed by their husbands in so-called "dowry 
deaths."34 These conditions have led to the use of abortion for the 
purpose of sex-selection in India. s5 
female children from a life of neglect and violence through sex-selective abortion. 
Regarding the protection of children from slavery through infanticide, see A. Leon 
Higginbotham, Jr., Race, Sex, Education and Missouri Jurisprudence: Shelley v. Kraemer in a 
Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 673, 694-95 (1989) (citingJane (a slave) v. The 
State, 3 Mo. 45 (1831) ); see also J. CALlFORNIA COOPER, FAMILY 34-38 (1991); TONI 
MORRISON, BELOVED 149, 158, 165 (1987). 
34. Roggencamp, supra note 33, at 270. "Dowry death" occurs in many cases 
where the husband or his family believes that the dowry should have been higher or 
where the full dowry has not been paid. Commentators often note that the reasons 
given for the murders of these women are pretextual. The term "dowry death" has 
only recently been included in the Indian Penal Code. "It is defined as the death of a 
woman caused by burns or other-than-normal circumstances within seven years of 
marriage, and in which the death has been preceded by dowry-related harassment." 
Nikki Lastreto & William Winans, The High Price ofMarriage in India: Burning Brides, 
THIS WoRLD, July 2, 1989, at 10. In 1986 the Indian Penal Code was amended to 
address the offense of dowry death. Section 304B of the Penal Code states that when 
a woman's death is caused by burns or bodily injury "or occurs under other than 
normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage, and when it is shown that 
shortly before her death she was subjected to cruelty in connection with any demand 
for dowry ... and the husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death." 
Jaising, supra note 32, at 54. One researcher has reported that in 1987 there were 
1,418 dowry deaths in India according to police records. Vibhuti Patel, Sex-Determina­
tion and Sex-Prese!£Ction Tests in India: Modern Techniques for Femicide, BULL. OF CON­
CERNED AsIAN SCHOLARS, Feb. 1989, at 6. Another commentator asserts that more 
than 5,000 dowry deaths occur each year in India. Jaising, supra note 32, at 54. 
35. There is a general consensus among doctors, commentators and others that 
the practice of sex-selective abortions is fairly common in India, though official or 
reliable numbers are hard to find. One smvey found that of 8,000 abortions per­
formed in Bombay, 7,999 were female fetuses. R. Jeffrey et al., Female Infanticide and 
Amniocentesis 19 (11) Soc. Sci. & MED. 1207-12 (1984); see also Lastreto & Winans, 
supra note 34, at 11; Jo McGowan, In India, They Abort Females, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 30, 
1989, at 12. A joint committee of the Indian Parliament found that between 1986 and 
1987, as many as 50,000 female fetuses were aborted in India after sex identifying tests 
were performed. Ajoy Bose, Abortion: Who Believes in A Woman'.s Right to Choose? 
GUARDIAN FEATURES, Aug. 11, 1992, at 15. 
One Indian province, Maharastra, (the state in which the city of Bombay lies), 
has made abortion for the purpose of sex-selection illegal. It has done so by the 
regulation of amniocentesis. See Weisman supra note 26, at Al. This law provides that 
amniocentesis is only permitted when medically indicated to determine possible birth 
defects. It provides prison sentences and fines for doctors who perform amni­
ocentesis for sex-selective purposes and for the female patients and their families who 
procure these services. Maharastra Legislature Secretariat, L.C. Bill No. VIII of 1988; 
see also Dorothy C. Wertz & John C. Fletcher, Fatal Knuwledge? Prenatal Diagnosis and 
Sex Se!£Ction, 19(3) HAsrINGS CENTER REP., 21, 25 (1989); Weisman, supra note 28, at 
Al. According to some obseIVers, however, there are sufficient "loopholes" to allow 
the use of amniocentesis for the selective abortion of female fetuses. Many Indian 
gynecologists have expressed the view that the selective abortion of female fetuses is a 
permissible and legitimate family planning tool. Vimal Balasubrahmanyan, Women As 
Targets in India's Family Planning Policy, in TEST TUBE WOMEN, supra note 2, at 153, 160­
61. 
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The sociological data indicates that Americans also have a strong 
preference for male children. Researchers of American parental sex 
preferences for children have consistently found that, although most 
Americans strive for "balanced" families (equal number of male and 
female children), Americans prefer male children as first-born chil­
dren and as only children.36 In families with an odd number of chil­
dren, Americans prefer to have more boys than girls.37 Studies show 
that women's attitudes toward the sex of their children are strikingly 
similar to those of men. Both women and men in the United States 
prefer to have male children rather than female children.38 Sons are 
still expected to carry on the family name as well as provide economic 
support to their parents when they are older.39 Sons are also pre­
ferred in Western culture because sons are still seen as proof of the 
father's masculinity.40 Lastly, sons are preferred because potential 
parents believe that boys will have vastly greater opportunities than 
girls.41 In one study of the sex preference for first-born children, re­
searchers found that 60 percent of those studied preferred a boy as a 
first-born child, while only 5 percent preferred a girl as the first-born 
child. There vvas little variation in the preferences of men and wo­
men.42 An earlier study of married women showed that one-half of 
the women studied had a general preference for sons, while only one­
third preferred daughters.43 
In a 1989 study, undergraduate college students without children 
were asked to state a preferred sex for their first child, as well as their 
·willingness to use sex-selective technology (not abortion) .44 Research­
ers found that 58 percent of men and 39 percent of women in the 
36. See, e.g., Nancy E. Williamson, Parental Sex Preferences and Sex Sdection, in SEx 
SELECI'ION OF CHILDREN, 129, 131 (Neil G. Bennett ed., 1983) [hereinafter Parental Sex 
Preferences]; Gerald E. Markle, Sex Ratio at Birth: Values, Variance and Some Determinants, 
11DEMOGRAPHY131, 133-37 (Feb. 1974). 
37. See, e.g., Markle, supra note 36, at 132. 
38. Pebley & Westoff, supra note 36, at 177-89; see also Nora Frenkiel, ''Family 
Planning": Baby Boy OT Girl?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1993, at Cl. 
39. Renteln, supra note 30, at 408; WARREN, supra note 4, at 14. 
40. Renteln, supra note 30, at 408. 
41. See id.; Michael Shapiro, A boy OT a girl? Should you be permitted to choose?, Los 
ANGELES DAILYJ., Aug. 2, 1989, at 7. 
42. Markle, supra note 36, at 133-37; cf. Williamson, Parental Sex Preferences, supra 
note 36, at 131. · 
43. Williamson, Boys OT Girls?, supra note 2, at 8. The only exception to this pref­
erence seems to be regarding adoption. Williamson, Parental Sex Preferences, supra 
note 36, at 131. Americans prefer girls for adoption. Researchers note that " 'appar­
ently adoptive parents are somewhat reluctant to risk the family name on an adopted 
male child.' " Renteln, supra note 30, at 411. 
44. Roberta Steinbacher & Faith Gilroy, Sex Selection Technology: A Prediction ofIts 
Use and Effect, 124(3) J. OF PSYCHOL. 283, 285 (1990) {The question posed to the 
volunteers: "Imagine a time when you are married, or if you are currently married, 
when you could inexpensively purchase a device or a pill that would allow you to 
select a boy or girl for your first child. Would you buy it and use it? Ifyou ·answered 
'Yes', what sex would you select?"). 
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study preferred boys as first children. Only 8 percent of the men and 
24 percent of women preferred girls as first-born children. Hence, 
the study showed a significant overall preference of college students 
for first-born boys, and that men preferred first-born boys significantly 
more than women.45 These researchers also found that there were no 
significant differences in sex preferences of first-born children due to 
class, age or race.46 Only 18 percent of the students smveyed ex­
pressed a willingness to use sex-selective technologies in order to real­
ize their preferences; among those who did, 73 percent preferred 
first-born sons. 47 
The cultural similarities and contrasts between South Asian and 
United States practices indicated that although son preference or son 
fixation is not culturally uniform and the intensity of the phenome­
non varies from culture to culture, it is nevertheless a feature of many 
developed and developing nations.48 Son preference and fixation are 
widespread because patriarchy is widespread49 and son preference 
and fixation are products of patriarchy. As Mary Anne Warren notes, 
45. Id. at 285. Steinbacher and Gilroy also found that while white men preferred 
sons significantly more than white women, black women are equally likely to prefer 
male children as black men, and that black women are more willing to use sex-selec­
tive technology than white women. Id. at 286-87. 
46. Id. at 287. But see contra, Roberta Steinbacher & Faith Gilroy, Preferencefor Sex 
ofChiUAnumg Primiparous Women, 119(6) J. OF PSYCHOL. 541, 544 (1985). Their study 
found that in a study of primiparous women (women who are pregnant for the first 
time) 59 percent of the women expressed no preference for the gender of their first 
child while approximately 23 percent preferred girls and 18 percent preferred boys. 
One possible explanation for this deviation from previous research is that "it is not 
considered appropriate today for an expectant mother to verbalize a choice of sex for 
her offspring.... Perhaps pregnant women are motivated by cognitive dissonance to 
express satisfaction with infants of either sex because, in their cases, such determina­
tion has already been made." Id. 
47. Steinbacher & Gilroy, supra note 40, at 286. In a study of women who had 
either amniocentesis or CVS, these researchers found that 19.2 percent of the women 
surveyed believed that a woman should have the right to obtain a legal abortion for 
the purposes of sex-selection. But only 5.3 percent of the women surveyed would 
consider an abortion for herself in order to choose the sex of her child. Aliza Kolker 
et al., supra note 3, at 59-60. 
48. See, e.g., Williamson, Boys or Girl.s?, supra, note 2, at 6-12; Williamson, Parental 
Sex Preferences and Sex Selection supra note 36, at 131-34. 
49. With regards to patriarchy, Heidi Hartmann has explained that: 
Radical feminists use patriarchy to refer to a social system characterized by 
male domination over women. . . . [It is] a set of social relations between 
men, which have a material base, and which, though hierarchical, establish 
or create interdependence and solidarity among men that enable them to 
dominate women . . . Patriarchy is not simply hierarchical organization, but hier­
archy in which particular people fill particular places. 
Heidi Hartmann, The Unhappy Marriage ofMarxism and Feminism: Towards a More Pro­
gressive Union, in WOMEN AND REVOLUTION l, 14, 18 (Lydia Sargent ed., 1981); see al.so 
GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY 239 (1986). 
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patriarchy is maintained inter alia through patriliny and patrilocality;50 
through the denial ofwomen's rights to sexual and reproductive inde­
pendence, ownership and inheritance of property, education, free­
dom of movement, economic employment and political participation; 
and through violence or threat ofviolence against women and girls.51 
The sociological predictions regarding the effects of sex-selective 
abortion on society highlight the dangers to which abortion for the 
purpose of sex-selection subjects American women.52 The first of 
these predictions is that the use of sex-selective abortion (and other 
sex-selection techniques) will result in a gender imbalance. Demogra­
phers have predicted that because of the overwhelming preference 
among American women and men for boys as first children, for boys 
as only children, and for more boys than girls in families with an odd 
number of children, the use of sex-selective procedures will further 
reduce the number of women in our sodety.53 Second, it has been 
predicted that this reduction will lead to greater discrimination 
against women and girls.54 Women in societies with such unbalanced 
sex ratios suffer from substantial constraints on their behavior, such as 
50. WARREN, supra note 4, at 13. Two components ofpatriarchy are patriliny and 
patrilocality. Patriliny is the inheritance of family names and property through the 
male line. Patrilocality is the practice where husbands determine where the married 
couple lives, usually with the husband's family group. Id. at 30 n.32. Female infanti­
cide is higher in preindustrial cultures practicing patrilocality. See, e.g., Hughes, supra 
note 33, at 109. Patrilocal societies are much more numerous than societies practic­
ing any other type of residential pattern. Id. at 110. Most patriarchal cultures are 
both patrilineal and patrilocal. 
51. WARREN, supra note 4, at 13. 
52. There are, of course, some predictions in favor of the use of sex-selective 
techniques. These predictions include that sex-selection would reduce the number of 
sex-linked diseases such as hemophilia and muscular dystrophy, see Jane Friedman, 
Legal Implications ofAmniocentesis, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 92 (1974); see also WARREN, supra 
note 4, at 160-63, reduce population growth, as women will have fewer children be­
cause they can be certain of getting precisely the child with the sex that they or their 
families want, see, e.g., Nathan Keyfitz, Forward, in SEX SELECTION OF CHILDREN, supra 
note 4, at xi, xiii, and be psychologically beneficial to all children, in that all children 
would know that they were wanted children and would reap the benefits of self-confi­
dence from that knowledge, see WARREN, supra note 4, at 173-75; Edward Pohlman, 
Some Effects of Being Able to Control Sex of Offspring, 14(4) EUGENICS QUARTERLY 278 
(Dec. 1967) (discussing the psychological effects on both parents and children when 
child is the "wrong" sex). On the issue of population control, see infra notes 58-60; on 
the issue of sex-linked disease see materials regarding abortion and disability, see infra 
note 112. 
53. CHRISTINE OvERALL, ETHICS AND HUMAN REPRODUCTION: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 
34 (1987). 
54. It has been predicted that an increase in first-born boys will lead to further 
discrimination against women in numerous areas, but particularly in education and 
employment. It is predicted that as a result of the "over-achiever" status of first-born 
children, where there are more men than women and where the men have the advan­
tage of first-born status, women will be able to acquire even less education and train­
ing than we currently receive, and as a result will be less able to compete for 
comparable employment. Schedler, supra note 10, at 299-301. 
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significant penalties for non-virginity before state recognized mar­
riage, proscriptions against adultery, extensive control by men over 
their wives and daughters, and the marriage of girls and women at 
younger ages.55 Women in these societies are also endangered by fe­
male infanticide and neglect,56 and by strong sex role ideologies, 
which socially and legally require women to behave according to mod­
els of submission and subordination.57 
The acceptance of sex-selection by a society will also result in the 
targeting of women and our fertility as a method of gender demo­
graphic politics. For example, Clare Boothe Luce argued that the in­
vention and use of a "male-child birth pill" would c9ntr_ol 
overpopulation in two ways: (1) women would have fewer children 
because they could predictively get the socially required number of 
male children, and (2) ifwomen had more male children than female 
children, then there would be fewer wombs and hence fewer babies. 
Luce argues that sex-selection is not merely one possible solution to 
the problem of population growth, but rather the only practical solu­
tion to the dilemma of population control.58 For example, Luce 
writes: 
The determining factor in the growth of all animal populations ... 
is the [birth] of female offspring. Only women have babies. And 
only girl babies grow up to be women . . . . In the overpopulated 
countries, the preference for males amounts to an obsession . . . . A 
pill ... which ... would assure the birth of a son would come as 
man-ah from Heaven.59 
What arguments such as Luce's neglect is that the choice ofmale chil­
dren over female children is a result of gender bias and that gender 
bias and gender discrimination are sometimes intractable obstacles 
for women.60 
Finally, the acceptance and use of sex-selective techniques will 
cause what sociologist NormaJuliet Wikler has called distributive con­
cerns. 61 Distributive concerns relate to the uneven, racist, heterosex­
55. See Hoskins & Holmes, supra note 2, at 247 (discussing feminist values and 
the case against sex preselection; arguing that sex-selection would yield more males 
and consequently exacerbate international male misbehavior); MARCIA GUITENTAG & 
PAUL SECORD, Too MANY WOMEN? THE SEX RATIO QUESTION 79 (1983) (discussing 
traditional role ofwomen withinJewish community, a population with high sex ratio). 
56. Hoskins & Holmes, supra note 2, at 247. 
57. GUITENTAG AND SECORD, supra note 55, at 79. 
58. Clare Boothe Luce, Only Women Have Babies, NATIONAL REvraw, July 7, 1978, 
at 826-27; see also PAUL EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB (1971). 
59. Luce, supra note 53, at 826. 
60. This was an important issue at the United Nations Conference on Population 
Control in Cairo in 1994. See, e.g., Reena Shah Stamets, Women's Bodies; Women's 
Rights, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 25, 1994, at ID (discussing how women and their 
reproductive abilities throughout the world are pawns of government policy). 
61. NormaJuliet Wikler, Society's Response to the New Reproductive Technologies: The 
Feminist Perspectives, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 1043, 1047-48 (1986); see generally Rowland, 
supra note 25, at 74-87. 
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ist and classist barriers to access the technology required to select the 
sex of children. In the United States, amniocentesis, chorionic villi 
sampling, and abortion are costly, and, as a result, will be available 
only to women of the middle and upper classes. Poor women, then, 
because of their financial inability to access these procedures, will con­
tinue to have female children. The result will be that women in our 
society will be poorer and darker. And as political scientist Laura 
Woliver suggests, "[c]lass inequalities in the future might even more 
closely follow gender [and race] as the rich have privileged first-born 
soris, and the poor have both sexes."62 In sum, the social effects of 
sex-selective abortion on women will be deleterious: patriarchal socie­
ties will use the technology in ways which will further the values of 
patriarchy - male preference and control over women and 
resources.63 
II. THE MORALI1Y OF SEX SELECTION: SOME 
PHILOSOPHICAL pARADIGMS 
[T]he impingi,ng reality of sex presekction [has] maved our discussion of 
manipulative medical technologi,es into the realm ofprevictimization, i.e., the 
spectre of women being destroyed and sacrificed before being born. 
-Janice Raymond (1981) 
Arguments concerning the morality of abortion for the purpose 
of sex-selection, or abortion more generally, typically take one of 
three analytic forms: deontological, consequentialist, or pragmatic.64 
62. Woliver, supra note 17, at 25; see also Roberta Steinbacher, Futuristic Implica­
tions ofSex Prese/ection, in THE CusroM MADE CHILD? WOMEN CENTERED PERSPECTIVES, 
supra note 2, at 187, 188. 
63. For example, artificial insemination results in a preponderance of male off­
spring. Approximately 160 boys are born via artificial insemination for every 100 girls. 
This disparity is caused by the timing of the procedure. Most physicians insist on 
performing the procedure as closely as possible to the time of ovulation. Because Y 
chromosome sperm have greater mobility, there is a greater chance that they will 
reach the ova before X chromosome sperm. Hence children born via artificial ihsem­
ination are most often male. See SHE.TILES & RoVIK, supra note 2, at 68. 
64. Rational-choice theory offers another method for assessing the cultural ac­
ceptance or disapproval of abortion for the purpose of sex-selection. Rational-choice 
theory is a normative explanatory theory which "tells us what we ought to do in order 
to achieve our aims as well as possible. It does not tell us what our aims ought to 
be.... Unlike moral theory, rational-choice theory offers conditional imperatives, 
pertaining to means rather than to ends." Jon Elster, Introduction, in RATIONAL 
CHOICE 1, 1 (Jon Elster ed., 1986) (footnotes omitted). That is, rational choice is 
properly defined as "a choice among alternative ends, on the basis of a given set of 
preferences and a given set of opportunities (i.e., a given set of available alterna­
tives)." John Harsanyi, Advances in Understanding Rational Behavior, in RATIONAL 
CHOICE, supra, at 85-86. Under this construction, the appropriateness of behavior or 
choices can only be determined if the choice is made without unjustified or unreason­
able constraints. 
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A. A Deontol,ogi,cal Perspective 
Deontological ethics holds that certain acts are morally right or 
wrong regardless of their consequences for human happiness or sad­
ness.65 A deontological philosophical understanding of abortion 
maintains that abortion may be right or wrong because the act of kill­
ing is right or wrong in and of itself. Morally good acts commonly 
entail fulfilling one's responsibilities toward others and respecting the 
rights of others. Under this rights-based theory, moral rights are first 
determined and then defended without the knowledge of whether 
these rights will increase the public welfare.66 "Once the scope of 
these protected interests is defined, any interference with these inter­
ests is said to be a violation of the rights of the person or group. "67 
Most deontological thinkers would agree that abortion under any cir­
cumstance is morally unacceptable because they believe a fetus is a 
human life,68 and it is always wrong to take an innocent life or poten-
Many contemporary thinkers in law, philosophy, and social theory have argued 
that prescriptive moral discourse should be characterized by a view toward expanding 
the scope ofmorally relevant options and effects. See, e.g., ROBERTO M. UNGER, SOCIAL 
THEORY: !Ts SITUATION AND !Ts TASK (1987) (criticizing Marxian determinism and 
"positivist" social science for failing to explain how social routines are preserved and 
subverted); LAWRENCE E. HAzELRIGG, Cl.AIMS OF KNOWLEDGE: ON THE LABOR OF MAK­
ING FOUND WORLDS (arguing in accord with Unger that necessetarian explanations in 
the social sciences enjoy unmerited normative force); Noam Chomsky, Equality, in 
THE CHOMSKY READER 182-202 (James Peck ed., 1987) (arguing that the conditions we 
create, not those that occur "naturally," inform the ethical responsibilities of social 
reformers). These authors share the characteristic of emphasizing the ethical impor­
tance of recognizing that the context in which social reforms and normative discourse 
take place is man-made and contingent, and therefore subject to being understood 
and radically revised by ordinary people. 
65. See 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 343 (1967); Schedler, supra note 10, at 
305 n.40. Deontological theories are associated with the natural rights tradition. Nat­
ural rights theory is one of individual entitlement. It disavows any suggestion that the 
consequences of any legal rule could justify the adoption or rejection of that rule. See 
Richard Epstein, The Utilitarian Foundations ofNatural Law, 12 HARv.J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 
713, 713 (1989). 
66. See WARREN, supra note 4, at 27; see alsoJOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 28 
(1971) ("in a just society the basic liberties are taken for granted and the rights se­
cured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social 
interests"). 
67. Randy E. Barnett, Forward: Of Chickens and Eggs - The Compatibility ofMoral 
Rights and Consequential Analysis, 12 HARv. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 611, 613 (1989). 
68. As Jeff McMahan notes, when opponents of abortion defend their position 
by claiming that the fetus is a human they mean "that the fetus shares those attributes, 
whatever they may be, the possession of which by normal adult human beings 
grounds the special presumption against killing them, making killing them considera­
bly more difficult to justify than, for example, the killing of animals." Jeff McMahan, 
The Right to Choose and Abortion, 22 PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 331, 331 (1993); cf. VATICAN, 
CONGREGATION ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, Instruction on Respectfor Human Life in 
its Origi.ns and Dignity ofProcreation: Replies to Certain Qµestions ofthe Day, in 16 ORIGINS 
(Mar. 19, 1987) [hereinafter VATICAN], reprinted in part in THE ETHICS OF REPRODUC­
TIVE TECHNOLOGY 83-97 (Kenneth D. Alpern ed., 1992) (human life begins at 
conception). 
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tial life. 69 
In contrast, some deontological philosophers argue that sex-se­
lective abortion is morally wrong because sexism70 is morally wrong. 
For these deontologists, a woman may take a fetal life for almost any 
reason she chooses so long as she does not choose a sexist reason. 71 
Underlying this reasoning is the belief that it is wrong to take a 
human life ·without just cause. Under either of these rationales, the 
conclusion that sex-selective abortion is morally unacceptable is 
reached by considering the fetus as a human life. Thus abortion is 
wrong because it is the unjustified killing of an innocent human 
being. 
A deontological argument in opposition to prohibitions on sex­
selective abortion would insist that the moral value to be protected is 
to be found in the individual's right to moral autonomy. Under such 
a construction, sex-selective abortion may be morally justified in that 
the decision to bear a child under any conditions or circumstances or 
for whatever reason is an essential part of moral autonomy. Interfer­
ing with that autonomy would be morally wrong as a violation ofdeon­
tological principles. 72 
In many ways, the deontological analysis offers an "easy way out." 
There is no way to defend the deontological position outside of its 
own dogma. For example, the deontological position in favor of 
prohibiting sex-selective abortion does not explain why the fetus is 
morally relevant, nor does it help us to identify why the fetus has more 
69. See, e.g., J. Finnis, The Rights and Wrong.r of Abortion: A Reply to Judith Jarvis 
Thomson, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 129-52, (R M. Dworkin ed., 1977) (previously 
published 2 PHIL. & PuB. A.FF. 117-45 (1977) (fetus as innocent) (a reply to Judith 
Jarvis Thomson, A Defense ofAbortion, 1 PHIL. & PuB. A.FF. 47-66 (1971)). See alsoR M. 
Hare, A Kantian Approach to Abortion, in RIGHT CONDUCT 147 (Michael D. Bayles & 
Kenneth Henley eds., 1989); cf. Paul Ramsey, Genetic Therafrj, in THE NEW GENETICS 
AND THE FUTURE OF MAN 157, 175 (M. Hamilton ed., 1972). 
70. As feminist philosopher Marilyn Frye notes: 
The term "sexist" characterizes cultural and economic structures which cre­
ate and enforce the elaborate and rigid patterns of sex-marking and sex­
announcing which divide the species, along lines of sex, into dominators 
and subordinates. Individual acts and practices are sexist which reinforce 
and support those structures, either as culture or as shapes taken on by the 
enculturated animals. Resistance to sexism is that which undermines those 
structures by social and political action and by projects or reconstruction 
and revision of ourselves. 
Marilyn Frye, Sexism, in THE POLITICS OF REALrrY: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 17, 38 
(1983). 
71. See, e.g., Tabitha Powledge, Unnatural Selection: On Choosing Children's Sex, in 
ETHICAL lssUEs IN MODERN MEDICINE 428, 430 (1983); Powledge, supra note 13, at 207; 
see also Schedler, supra note 10, at 305 n.42. 
72. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Schneider, Workability of the Undue Burden Test, 66 TEM­
PLE L. REv. 1003, 1036 (1993) (pro-choice view satisfies Kantian ethical approach}; cf. 
Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense ofAbortion, 1 PHIL. & PuB. A.FF. 47 (1971). 
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moral relevancy than unfertilized ova or sperm.73 It presumes obvi­
ously questionable moral or ethical values to be universal and provides 
women with a moral defense, albeit questionable, of their choice to 
abort for sex-selective purposes. 74 In addition, the deontological posi­
tion that sex-selective abortion is wrong because it is the unjustified 
taking of a human life is troubling because it negates the pregnant 
woman's moral agency and her biological role in reproduction. The 
fetus is alive because the pregnant woman has made it viable. To ig­
nore her contribution to the fetus' existence by giving the fetus equal 
moral standing with the pregnant woman denies the pregnant wo­
man, and women generally, full moral status. 75 To view the moral 
status of the fetus as equal also devalues the social contributions pro­
vided by women who give birth and raise children. 76 
B. Consequentialism 
Consequentialism is also known as utilitarianism. There are two 
major categories of utilitarian thought: rule utilitarianism and act util­
itarianism. Rule utilitarians believe that an act is morally wrong if the 
act violates a prescribed moral rule. Rule utilitarians regard a clear 
normative system as essential to an ordered society. In other words, 
rule utilitarians believe that the best approach is to follow moral rules 
and evaluate the consequences offollowing those rules in the category 
of circumstances in dispute. "The theory is utilitarian in that it esti­
mates the value of actions by reference to their consequences, but the 
actions are not divorced from the obligation to follow moral rules. "77 
Act utilitarians, on the other hand, make moral judgments based on 
the consequences to others of specific acts or patterns ofaction. That 
is to say, act utilitarianism is "an ethical method based on an assess­
ment of consequences for individual situations. "78 As such, act utilita­
rianism eschews adequate confrontation of large socio-ethical issues 
like sex selection. 79 
73. WARREN, supra note 4, at 94; see also Frances Olsen, Unraveling Compromise, 103 
HAR.v. L. REv. 105, 127 (1989). 
74. The moral status of the human fetus has been the subject of some contro­
versy, particularly since 1973. For differing views, see e.g., Michael]. Flowers, Neu.r<>­
maturation of the Human Fetus, 10 J. MEo. & PHIL. 237, 246-48 (1985); VATICAN, supra 
note 68. 
75. See GENA CoREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES FROM 
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION To ARTIFICIAL WOMBS 61 (1985) (noting that women must 
bear the discomfort and socially adverse consequences of sex selection); Mary Anne 
Warren, The Moral Significance of Birth, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 
198, 209 (Helen Bequaert Holmes & Laura Purdy eds., 1992); see also ADRIENNE RICH, 
OF WOMAN BoRN 266-67 (1976) (internal citations omitted). 
76. Cf. Sylvia A. Law, Abortion Compromise - Inevitable and Impossible, 1992 U. ILL. 
L. REv. 921, 936 (1992) [hereinafter Abortion Compromise]. 
77. John C. Fletcher, Ethics and Public Policy: Should Sex Choice be Discouraged, in 
SEx SELECTION OF CHILDREN, supra note 4, at 213, 222-23. 
78. Id. at 223 (emphasis added). 
79. Id. 
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When referring to consequentialist philosophy in the context of 
sex-selective abortion, I am referring to the moral theories of rule util­
itarianism which "hold that we should consider first the consequences 
that follow from applying the moral practices of the community to the 
decisions at hand."80 And if "it can be shown that consistently follow­
ing this moral policy leads to reprehensible amounts of pain . . . or 
long-term social upheaval, we are obligated to reassess the ordering of 
moral rules."81 Contemporary consequentialist philosophy is con­
cerned not only with principles of right and wrong, but also With his­
torical circumstances and institutional arrangements. It "takes 
seriously the wide-reaching and highly dispersed effects that the ac­
tions of individuals and associations may often have on others. "82 
Hence consequentialist analysis is often understood as protecting the 
public sphere from the harmful acts of individuals. Under this ethical 
tradition, abortion generally is morally defensible if the net beneficial 
consequences to society of permitting abortion are greater than the 
net benefits of prohibiting abortion. It is generally understood, 
although by no means uncontested, that the social benefits to women 
(and hence to society) of permitting abortion are greater than the 
benefits of prohibiting it. 
One consequentialist position is that sex-selective abortion in a 
society with institutional biases directed against women would result 
in harms to women over time. As previously noted, the sociological 
data indicates that a smaller population ofwomen, particularly if their 
smaller numbers were due to sex-selection, would be disastrous for 
women.83 As George Schedler recognizes, the social costs of sex-selec­
tive abortion may not be borne solely by the woman seeking the abor­
tion. Rather, the costs are borne by future generations of women in 
the form of increased discrimination against them: "It is beyond ques­
tion, however, that women would pay the cost for the preponderance 
of males in terms of their disappointment, trauma, and lowered ex­
pectations."84 This analysis is in line with the tradition of liberal utili­
tarian thinking: "the only purpose for which power can rightfully be 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, 
is to prevent harm to others. "85 
Although this consequentialist analysis seems to present a coher­
ent argument against the use of abortion or pre-conceptive tech­
niques for the purpose ofsex-selection, such a position fails to address 
80. Id. at 224. 
81. Id.; see all-o]ohn Rawls, Two Concepts ofRu'les, 64 PHIL. REv. 3 (1955). 
82. Barnett, supra note 67, at 618; see all-o Epstein, supra note 65, at 715. 
83. See supra pp. 173-75 regarding the effects of further gender imbalance. 
84. Schedler, supra note 10, at 310. 
85. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rappaport ed., 1978); seeJOEL 
FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS (1984) {discussing what types of power the state may 
rightly exercise over individuals in the form of criminal sanctions to prevent harms to 
others); Schedler, supra note 10, at 308-11, 310 n.53. 
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the problem of indeterminacy:86 the outcome of sex-selective abor­
tion may be difficult to predict given the variables involved. This con­
sequentialist position also fails to consider the problem ofuncertainty: 
the fact that we cannot know with complete accuracy whether these 
negative social consequences will ever occur.87 Our societal interest 
in liberty does not allow us to restrict the liberty of citizens without 
good cause - it is unclear whether predictions regarding deleterious 
consequences would constitute harm sufficient to warrant limitations 
on liberty. Finally, this consequential analysis fails to recognize that 
the individual decision to use abortion for the purpose of sex-selec­
tion can be viewed as a morally correct decision under other types of 
consequentialist thinking. Oppressive circumstances in a woman's life 
or environment may make the choice of sex-selective abortion morally 
defensible, even under a consequentialist analysis. The morally rele­
vant circumstances for these women are the amount of discrimina­
tion, and hardship, and perhaps the violent death their daughters will 
face if they are born. Warren makes a similar point with respect to the 
rationality of individual sex-selection choices. 88 
A consequentialist analysis can also be used to discourage the 
prohibition of sex-selective abortion. This analysis is based on the be­
lief that the consequence of prohibiting sex-selective abortion is the 
deepening and reinforcing of the misogyny that women already en­
counter in patriarchal society by denigrating women as moral deci­
sion-makers and reinforcing our role as sexual objects.89 As women 
are increasingly viewed as irresponsible moral and sexual agents, 
greater restrictions on women's sexuality and reproductive capacities 
are deemed acceptable.90 Hence, consequentialist analysis can also be 
used convincingly to argue that a prohibition on sex-selective abortion 
86. Indeterminacy is distinct from uncertainty. Indeterminacy refers to the qual­
ity of a problem which makes an outcome difficult or impossible to predict because 
the variables involved do not necessitate a specific answer. Uncertainty refers to the 
accuracy of a predictive model. 
87. See WARREN, supra note 4, at 179; Powledge, supra note 13, at 195. 
88. See WARREN, supra note 4, at 79-80; see also infra pp. 208-12 for a discussion of 
liberal feminism; Hannah Arendt, What is Freedom?, in BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 155 
(1969) (rights have value in "the realm where freedom is a worldly reality, tangible in 
words which can be heard and deeds which can be seen"); see generally CATHARINE 
MAcK!NNON, ONLY WORDS (1993). 
89. See Olsen, supra note 73, at 121; see also Law, Abortion Compromise, supra note 
76, at 940 (mandating waiting periods sends a powerful message: women make rash 
decisions and women are not competent moral or practical decision-makers). 
90. Carol Smart, Disruptive Bodies and Unruly Sex: The Regulation of Reproduction 
and Sexuality in the Nineteenth Century, in REGULATING WOMANHOOD: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 
ON MARRIAGE, MOTHERHOOD AND SEXUALnY 7 (1992); The Republican Party's pro­
posed Personal Responsibility Act in the CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, quoted in 94 TAX 
NoTES TODAY 222 (Nov. 14, 1994) (asserting that "government should encourage peo­
ple to work, not to have children out of wedlock"). 
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would work against the goal of sex equality by reinforcing the socio­
political subordination and oppression of women.91 
C. Pragmatism 
Pragmatists belong to a philosophic school of thought which is 
founded on the belief that philosophy should examine the conse­
quences of proposed theories when investigating issues of truth and 
the probable effects of solving human needs and problems.92 
Pragmatists believe that it is necessary to examine context when evalu­
ating any proposed action, that "it is critical to pay attention to partic­
ular details of problems and to the effects of the solutions."93 
Feminist philosopher Mary Anne Warren, in her work concern­
ing the moral question of the sex-selection of children, adopts a prag­
matic moral approach. Instead of determining the moral status of 
sex-selection through an analysis of the "formal moral theories," War­
ren "adopts the more pragmatic procedure of first exploring the con­
text within which sex selection must be viewed."94 She considers each 
of the moral objections to sex-selection in the light of this overall con­
text. She views both moral rights and consequential analyses as com­
ponents of a coherent moral theory.95 As a result Warren derives her 
moral conclusions from both sociological predictions regarding the 
effects of sex-selection on women and the assertion of rights. In her 
view, rights should or should not be advanced based exclusively on 
their value to the goal ofgender equality.96 Central to Warren's analy­
sis of sex-selection is her view that "gendercide" is morally wrong. 97 
91. Regarding liberal feminism and its use of consequentialism to argue against 
prohibitions, see discussion infra pp. 209-12. 
92. Pragmatism is an anti-foundational moral philosophy, for which "the valida­
tion ofknowledge'1.aims rests on practical judgments constituted by and constructed 
in, dynamic social practices." Knowledge, for the pragmatist, is acquired by "self-criti­
cal and self-correcting human processes." Cornel West, The Limits ofNeopragma,tism, in 
PRAGMATISM IN LAw AND SoCIE'IY 121, 121-22 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 
1991) [hereinafter The Limits ofNeopragma,tism]. Pragmatism is contextual and instru­
mental, emphasizing both context and culture of "which we can never be fully aware," 
and shaping and testing thought by its use toward the realization of human goals. 
Thomas Grey, 'What is Good Legal Pragmatism? in PRAGMATISM IN LAw AND SOCIETY, 
supra, at 9, 15; see also MargaretJane Radin. The Pragmatist and the Feminist, in PRAGMA­
TISM IN LAw IN SOCIETY, supra, at 127, 134. 
93. Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1597, 
lfilO(W9~. . . 
94. WARREN, supra note 4, at 27-28. 
95. Id. at 31 n.60. On the compatibility of deontological theory and consequen­
tialism, see also Barnett, supra note 67, at 612, 614; Hare, supra note 69; and RAWLS, 
supra note 66. 
96. WARREN, supra note 4, at 27; see generally Arendt, supra note 88, at 155 (rights 
have value in "the realm where freedom is a worldly reality, tangible in words which 
can be heard and deeds which can be seen"); MAcKINNON, ONLY WORDS, supra note 
88. 
97. According to Warren, a law or policy is genocidal if "{l) it results in an abso­
lute or relative reduction in the number of persons of a particular [sex]; and (2) the 
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For Warren, gendercide, like genocide, is a crime against humanity, 
because it deprives everyone of the contribution that would be made 
by the particular class of persons who are its victims, and because of 
the implicit devaluation of all members of the victimized gender.9s 
Warren points to the indeterminacy of consequentialist thinking 
as a reason for rejecting that view, and argues for "freedom of choice." 
Warren asserts that even though she believes that sex-selection is mor­
ally wrong, we should not seek to discourage sex-selective abortion by 
either legal prohibition or moral persuasion. Instead, she claims that 
the right to make reproductive decisions is a deeply personal right to 
be defended with care. Accordingly, the moral presumption regard­
ing sex-selective abortion should be in support of the freedom to 
choose, which cannot be nullified by the mere possibility of harmful 
effects to women's equality.99 She defines the freedom of choice as a 
"positive value" which ought to be maintained "in the absence of pow­
erful countervailing arguments."100 In order to override this pre­
sumption, the proponents must demonstrate that the prohibition on 
sex-selection would produce greater benefits than tolerance. Accord­
ing to Warren, "[e]ven an action which is inherently immoral should 
not be legally prohibited unless there are good reasons to believe that 
prohibition will be beneficial."101 Because freedom of choice is a posi­
tive value, as well as a method for the realization of other positive 
values, it requires more than a substantial risk of net social harm to 
show that it ought to be prohibited.102 She describes this philosophi­
cal position as having both a meta-ethical component and a pragmatic 
component. She attributes her emphasis on freedom of choice to the 
metaethical value in giving presumptive "respect for persons as auton­
omous agents." Accordingly, mentally competent adults are morally 
entitled to as much freedom as is consistent with the equal freedom 
and basic moral rights of others.103 Warren defends her position by 
attesting to the danger that a legal prohibition on sex-selective abor­
means whereby this result is brought about are morally objectionable for independ­
ent reasons - e.g., because they violate certain individuals' right to life, liberty, or 
security against wrongful assault." WARREN, supra note 4, at 22-24. Example of 
gendercidal, or more specifically gynocidal, institutions and practices include female 
infanticide, witch burning, genital mutilation, widow-sacrifice, and the denial of re­
productive freedom. See generally id. at 32-55. 
98. WARREN, supra note 4, at 24. Warren uses the gender-neutral term 
"gendercide" to describe the decline of the number of women due to sex-selection 
instead of the gender-specific terms "gynocide" or "femicide," because she believes 
that sex-selection can be used against men or biased in favor of female fetuses. War­
ren asserts that sex-selection can be used by women as a feminist tool. For example, 
Warren suggests that women can use sex-selection technology to refuse to birth and 
raise sons as a means of combatting patriarchy. Id. at 175-76. 
99. WARREN, supra note 4, at 25-26. 
100. Id. at 180. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 182 (emphasis in the original). 
103. Id. at 180. 
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ti.on would have on all other aspects ofwomen's reproductive freedom 
in the contemporary and historical context of patriarchal opposition 
to women's reproductive freedom. 104 
D. Pragmatism ModifiedI05 
Many radical thinkers have sought to redefine pragmatism and 
pragmatic method with the goal of using a modified pragmatism as a 
tool in a political theory of liberation for oppressed peoples. These 
scholars focus on a social context which has a socio-economic struc­
ture of political and economic struggles, as well as racial, gendered, 
religious and sexual identi.ti.es.106 For neo-pragmati.st philosopher 
Comel West, pragmatism's focus on context reflects a political theory. 
It enables forms of cultural criticism that challenge hierarchical polit­
ical and social arrangements that have harmed people of color, wo­
men of all races, and poor peoples.107 Thus "context" in a modified 
pragmatic framework refers less to the experiences of uniquely situ­
ated individuals, but instead refers to the structures of historical and 
contemporary discrimination based on race, gender, sexual orienta­
tion or preference and class. As a result, modified pragmatic method 
facilitates challenges to political and philosophic theories which, like 
traditional pragmatism, speak in the language of liberalism and indi­
vidual rights.108 
Mary Anne Warren argues, for example, that the moral presump­
tion in favor of the freedom of choice should not be overridden by 
the mere possibility of harmful effects, such as the sociological predic­
tions of increases in violence and discrimination against women if sex­
rati.os suffer further imbalances in favor of men and boys. What War­
ren's construction of the context (the sociological data} fails to con­
sider is the additional relevance of the sex-identified fetus as a 
representative of its gender. Warren's contextual emphasis is upon 
the rights of individuals, or the unique experiences of individuals. 
Warren's contextual focus is not historical or contemporary discrimi­
nation on the basis of race and gender. Although Warren believes 
that the morally relevant context is that male-biased sex-selection 
would have the consequence of harming future generations of wo­
men, Warren does not believe that these consequences to women as a 
social group surpass the importance of individual liberty. In other 
words, although she acknowledges the moral relevance ofmale bias in 
sex-selection, it is not enough, even as a reality, to overcome her lib­
104. Id. at 184. 
105. This phrase is taken from Mari Matsuda's article, Pragma,tism Modified and 
the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S. CAL. L. RE:v. 1763 (1990), concerning the use of a 
modified pragmatic philosophy in critical race theory. 
106. CORNEL WEST:, THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY: A GENEALOGY OF 
PRAGMATISM 208-10, 215 (1989) [hereinafter THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY]. 
107. Id. 
108. Minow & Spelman, supra note 93, at 1627. 
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eral presumptions concerning the importance of "liberty". The fail­
ure of Warren's framework, as well as most other traditional 
philosophic paradigms, is that it considers the issue of the morality of 
sex-selective abortion in isolation from other relevant questions re­
garding social, political, and economic practices that oppress women. 
Feminist philosopher Susan Sherwin notes that traditional philoso­
phies "are generally grounded in masculinist conceptions of freedom 
(e.g., privacy, individual choice, individuals' property rights in their 
own bodies) that do not meet the needs [and] interests ... of many 
... women."109 
As do most feminists, I view the fetus in abortion as having no 
independent moral status, but it may, under some circumstances, be 
morally relevant to the discussion of abortion. Because the fetus 
grows and lives inside a woman's body, it is the experiences and the 
lives of women that set the parameters of the moral inquiry. While 
the fetus does not have an independent existence, its life tied to the 
woman inside whose body it grows, the fetus' existence has a 
profound impact on the lived experience of the woman. Hence, my 
view of the moral status of the fetus and the morality of abortion is 
grounded in the reality of women's lives which make abortion neces­
sary.110 This is the context in which the abortion of an ungendered 
fetus must be considered. Sex-selective abortion requires the consid­
eration of other relevant aspects of the social world, including the ef­
fect of sex-selective abortion on women as a social group. 
Therefore, in contrast to Warren, I am arguing that the morally 
relevant consequences of sex-selection are not the harm to the partic­
ular fetus, but rather the injuries to future generations ofwomen and 
the moral relevance of the decision to abort a particular fetus based 
on its gender. My contextual focus is shaped by the historical and con­
temporary discrimination and other harms done to women as a social 
group. As a result, it is morally relevant to me that the fetus is termi­
nated because she is a girl and not because she is a fetus - gender 
neutral. 
When a woman decides to abort a fetus because of its sex, she 
forecloses the "easy way out" for moral philosophy wherein the fetus is 
or is not a morally relevant being. Sex-selective abortion, because it is 
selective, makes the characteristics of the fetus to be aborted morally 
relevant. By describing the fetus as morally relevant, I am not sub­
scribing to a view of fetal personhood, nor am I equating the moral 
status of the fetus with the moral status of the pregnant woman. I can 
109. Susan Shenvin, Abortion Through a Feminist Ethics Lens, in LIVING WITH CON· 
TRAOICTIONS: CONTROVERSIES IN FEMINIST SOCIAL ETHICS 314, 314 (Alison M. Jaggar 
ed., 1994). 
llO. See CATHARINE A. MAcKrNNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 
184-94 (1989). Rosalind Petchesky also notes that this foundational aspect offeminist 
think about abortion is often inchoate and unarticulated. See PETCHESKY, supra note 
16, at 327. 
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think of no situation or circumstance in which I would make such an 
equation. Instead I believe that choosing or not choosing a particular 
fetus on account ofits sex makes the sex-identified fetus relevant. It is 
the use of invidious criteria for selection that imparts morally relevant 
attributes to the fetus; it is the desire to "de-select" for those character­
istics that gives the fetus greater moral standing or presence. The sex­
identified fetus is no longer the generic fetus in the abortion not mo­
tivated by fetal gender. By identifying its sex we have particularized it, 
and hence decisions regarding aborting it are based on its projected 
individual characteristics instead of, or in addition to, concerns about 
the woman, her bodily integrity, and her life circumstances. The deci­
sion to abort is then a decision based on the fetus' qualities, not the 
circumstances of the woman's life. 
The sex-identified fetus subject to abortion becomes engendered 
because a decision to abort the fetus is made based on cultural no­
tions of what it means in the society to be gendered male or female. 
Thus, a particular sex-identified fetus becomes representative of its 
gender. 111 Under these circumstances the aborting of a female fetus 
would be a declaration concerning the social value ofwomen or girls: 
that we are, as a group, less valuable and unwanted. A pragmatist 
might also argue that sex-selective abortion is wrong because of the 
historical and contemporary devaluation of women and girls as a so­
cial group. Women's lower status is perpetuated by this type of choice 
and because ofwhat it says about the value ofwomen and girls in this 
society. We can thus consider sex-blind abortions justified by a wo­
man's right to decide her future or because we believe that fetuses 
lack morally relevant characteristics, and at the same time consider 
sex-selective abortions morally unjustified because the abortion im­
pliedly and immediately asserts that the lives of women and girls are 
less valuable or less desirable.112 This position is supported by my un­
111. "Sex" is a term describing the biological/physiological differences between 
male and female. On the other hand, "gender" "is the cultural definition ofbehavior 
defined as appropriate to the sexes in a given society at a given time. Gender is a set 
of cultural roles. It is a costume, a mask, a straightjacket in which men and women 
dance their unequal dance." LERNER, supra note 49, at 238. Jane Flax, another femi­
nist scholar, shares Lerner's view. Flax writes: "Gender connotes and reflects the 
persistence of asymmetric power relations rather than 'natural' (biological/anatomi­
cal) 'differences' (e.g., mind/body, reason/emotion, public/private) is identified as 
differences and as salient to and constituent of gender." Jane Flax, Beyond Equality: 
Gender, justice and Difference, in BEYOND EQUALITY AND DIFFERENCE: CITIZENSHIP, FEMI­
NIST POLITICS AND FEMALE SUBJECTMTY 193, 193 (Gisela Block & Susan James eds., 
1992); see also CATHARINE A. MAcK!NNON, TowARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 
160 (1989). 
112. Similar arguments can be made with respect to the abortion of mentally or 
physically disabled fetuses. Women who decide to abort disabled fetuses are making 
decisions regarding how they think these children will affect their lives and what they 
want their experience of motherhood to be. Women who make these decisions 
(along with the rest ofsociety) are also making a statement about the appropriateness 
of our goals of physical and mental perfection for our children and ourselves which 
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derstanding of social context which includes an examination of 
patriarchal structures, historical and contemporary gender 
discrimination.11s 
Considering the overall historical and contemporary social con­
text in which the decision to abort a fetus on the basis of fetal sex 
occurs, contemplating the liberal value of "tolerance" in the context 
of the goal of gender equality, and weighing the sociological and his­
torical evidence that a moral policy of tolerance will lead to continued 
and exacerbated long-term social upheaval, we may be obligated to 
serves to demean, devalue and isolate members of our society who currently live with 
disabilities. Cultural acceptance of abortion under these circumstances also overlooks 
the reality that many disabilities can be managed through technology, early interven­
tion programs for young disabled children, social programs, and social change. 
Deborah Kaplan, Disability Rights Perspectives on Reproductive Technologies and Public Pol­
icy, in REPRODUCTIVE LAws FOR THE 1990's 241, 245 (Sherrill Cohen & Nadine Taub 
eds., 1989). Thus, in many respects, disabled fetuses can be understood as represen­
tative ofdisabled members of our society, and perhaps we should rethink whether it is 
morally permissible to encourage women to abort these fetuses. CJ. Adrienne Asch,· 
Reproductive Technology and Disability, in REPRODUCTIVE LAws FOR THE 1990's, supra, at 
69, 86; Adrienne Asch & Michelle Fine, Shared Dreams: A Left Perspective on Disability 
Rights and Reproductive Rights, in FROM .ABORTION TO REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM: TRANS. 
FORMING A MOVEMENT 233, 237-38 (Marlene Gerber Fried ed., 1990); Martha Field, 
Killing "the Handicapped" - Before and After Birth, 16 HARv. WOMEN'S LJ. 79, 115 
(1993). 
113. The question remains whether the sex-selective abortion of male fetuses 
gives me the same level of philosophical and political angst. The answer, of course, is 
- well, it depends. While the decision to abort a fetus identified as white and male 
may be an expression of an individual woman's devaluation of white men and boys, 
such an abortion takes place in a context that is supportive and affirming of men and 
boys - patriarchy. Patriarchy as a social, legal and economic structure in this country 
has supported white male power. As a result, white men do not suffer from condi­
tions of historical or contemporary discrimination or physical and economic violence 
as women of all races do. Therefore, the abortion of a white male fetus does not 
represent the devaluation men as a social group. Instead, such an abortion can be 
viewed as a form of cultural criticism - challenging hierarchial political and social 
institutions. See WE<sr, THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 106 at 208­
10, 215. 
The ethical and political implications of aborting a black male fetus because of its 
gender are much different from the implications of aborting of a white male fetus. 
Although the abortion of a black male fetus arises in the same social context of the 
abortion of a white male fetus - a context in which white men enjoy higher status 
and value - the consequences of aborting a black male fetus due to its gender are 
more complex. Notwithstanding the cultural support and acknowledgement that 
black boys and men receive because they are male, the context for the abortion of a 
fetus identified as black and male also includes the context of Black boys and men as 
victims of patriarchy, because racism (like misogyny) is one of the many tools of our 
patriarchal social, economic and political structure. For example, black men, like 
women of all races, suffer from systemic discrimination in education and employ­
ment, as well as physical and psychic violence. So while the abortion of fetuses identi­
fied as black and male could be understood as challenging patriarchal political and 
social institutions, it could also be understood as a response to the devaluation of 
black men and boys in our society and as facilitating this cultural norm. 
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reassess our commitment to the rhetoric of abortion on demand and 
to consider which values we sincerely want to advance.114 
III. THE PRIVACY DOCTRINE 
. . . appell,ant and some amici argue that the woman's right is absolute and 
that she is entitl,ed to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever 
way, and for whatever reason she alone chooses. With this we do not agree. 
-Justice Bl,ackmun, Rne v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
A. The 01,d Guard: Constitutional llight to Abortion 
The Supreme Court first articulated the right to privacy, as ap­
plied to contraception, pregnancy, and abortion, in Griswol,d v. Con­
necticut.115 The Court held unconstitutional a Connecticut statute 
which prohibited the sale to and use of contraceptive devices by mar­
ried couples.116 The Griswol,d Court reasoned that a right to privacy 
was inherent in the marriage relationship and included the right to 
decide about the use of contraception. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the 
Court later expanded this right to privacy in contraception to include 
single people as well.117 These decisions sexved as the constitutional 
basis for the Court's decisions in Rne v. Wade118 and its companion 
case, Doe v. Bolton. n 9 In these cases, the Supreme Court prohibited 
the criminalization of most abortions. In Rne, the Court articulated a 
right to privacy "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision 
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."120 While neither Rne nor 
Doe guarantees women access to abortion on demand,121 both cases 
114. Feminists have begun to develop analyses regarding feminine and feminist 
methods of ethical reasoning. Examples of this work include: CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A 
DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982) (Gilli­
gan refers to an "ethic ofcare" under which non-violence, relationships, responsibility 
for self and others, compassion, and self-sacrifice influence women's reasoning and 
decision-making); Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, 6 FEMINIST STUD. 342 (1980) 
("Maternal thinking" refers to the union ofreflection,judgment, and emotion. Intel­
lectual activities are distinguishable, but not separate, from feeling); see also Nancy 
Chodorow et al., in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE (Deborah L. 
Rhode ed., 1990). 
115. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
116. Id. at 485-86. For an analysis of the history of contraception and abortion, 
see LINDA GoRDON, WoMAN's BODY, WoMAN's RIGHT: A SocIAL HISTORY OF BmTH 
CONTROL IN AMERICA (1976). 
117. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). AsJustice Brennan stated, "If the 
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to 
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally af­
fecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id. at 453 ( empha­
sis in original). 
118. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
119. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
120. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
121. Id. at 154, 155; Doe, 410 U.S. at 189; see also Planned Parenthood of South­
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2826 (1992) (even the broadest read­
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clearly state that in the first and second trimesters women must be 
free to consider the circumstances of their lives that would make the 
birth of a child physically or emotionally undesirable. The Court in 
!We reasoned: 
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a dis­
tressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent ... 
There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the un­
wanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a 
family already unable, psychologically or otherwise, to care for it ... 
All these are factors the woman and her responsible physician nec­
essarily will consider in consultation.122 
Due to these factors, the majority in !We seems to have recognized 
a woman's right to abort a non-viable fetus as a fundamental right.12s 
The Court reasoned that the state's interest in preserving potential 
human life and protecting maternal health is not sufficiently compel­
ling to justify the prohibition of abortion in the first and second tri­
mesters of a pregnancy.124 The Court found that only during the 
third trimester, at the point of fetal viability, is the state's interest com­
pelling enough to justify regulation of the abortion right.125 
!We, however was not without its problems. The Court also struc­
tured the abortion right as the right of a physician to perform a medi­
cal procedure, thus upholding abortion both as a woman's right to 
choose whether to continue a pregnancy, and as the physician's right 
to make a medical decision for his126 patient. 
The decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer 
medical treatment according to his professional judgment up to the 
points where important state interests provide compellingjustifica­
tions for intervention. Up to those points, the abortion decision in 
all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and 
basic responsibility for it must rest with the physician.127 
ing of Roe does not suggest that there is a constitutional right to abortion on 
demand). 
122. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
123. Id. at 153, 155. 
124. Id. at 163, 164. 
125. Id. at 163-64. Although the Court held that at no point may the state pro­
hibit abortion where the abortion is necessary to preserve the life or health of the 
pregnant woman, the Court in Roe held that the state's interest in the preservation of 
maternal health is sufficiently compelling after the first trimester of pregnancy. After 
the first trimester, the state "may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that 
the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal 
health." Id. at 163. 
126. According to the American Medical Association, seventy-seven percent ofall 
obstetrician/ gynecologists are male. AMERICAN MEDICAL AssoCIATION, DEPARTMENT 
OF PHYSICIAN DATA SERVICES, Characteristics ofPhysicians, Table 4 (Jan. l, 1990). 
127. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165-66. The Court's trimester analysis suggests it foresaw 
the role of physicians in decision-making as involving, according to physician's judg­
ment, the best interest of the pregnant woman's health. Although the Court fashions 
the abortion right/decision as a joint decision of the pregnant woman and her physi­
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As Ellen Wright Clayton and other scholars have noted, the Court's 
conclusion that the abortion decision be made by two people is a posi­
tion that utterly contrasts the general rhetoric incorporated in in­
formed consent cases, that the patient is the one who decides whether 
or not a medical procedure is to be performed. The power that the 
Court gives to the physician is not warranted. As Clayton states, "It is 
certainly clear that decisions whether or not to continue a pregnancy 
usually involve value judgements for which doctors have no particular 
claim to expertise. Furthermore, this formulation of two party deci­
sion-making grants physicians and the institution ofmedicine unusual 
power over the destiny ofwomen."128 Moreover, the abortion right in 
R.oe was conceived of, and constructed, as a negative right, allowing 
the Court to articulate the right without ensuring a constitutional 
right to access abortion services. For example, the Court has continu­
ously held that the state's or federal government's denial of funding 
of abortions for indigent women is permissible because these denials: 
place no obstacles absolute or othenvise in the pregnant woman's 
path to an abortion..An indigent woman who desires an abortion 
suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision 
to fund childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on pri­
vate sources for the seIVices she desires. The state may have made 
childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the wo­
man's decision, but it has imposed no restriction on access to abor­
tions that was not already there.129 
clan, I am not sure how important this construction is to women's choice or access to 
abortion. Physicians are ethically disinclined from encouraging elective surgical pro­
cedures on patients (but see cases regarding forced sterilizations), and as a colleague 
pointed out, except where the woman is coerced or otherwise forced by friends, fam­
ily members, or her lover, it is always up to the pregnant woman to schedule the 
appointment for the abortion, as well as show up at the appointed hour. 
128. Ellen Wright Clayton, Women & Advances in Medical Technologies: The Legal 
Issues, in WOMEN & NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: MEDICAL, PSYCHOSOCIAL, 
LEGAL AND ETHICAL DILEMMAS 89, 96 (Judith Radin & Aila Collins eds., 1991). 
129. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977); see also Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980). In 
Webster, the challenged Missouri law prohibited inter alia the use of public employees 
and public hospitals to perform even privately paid abortion services that were not 
necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman. The Court held that like the stat­
utes and federal regulations at issue in Maher and McRae, the Missouri statute was 
simply another way in which the state may permissibly encourage childbirth over 
abortion. Webster, 492 U.S. at 519-20. The Missouri law also includes: 1) a legislative 
finding that life begins at conception; 2) mandatory viability tests to be performed 
after 20 weeks gestation to determine whether or not the fetus is viable; and 3) the 
prohibition of the use of public employees or facilities to counsel women about the 
option of abortion. See also Rust v. Sullivan, lll S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (extended state's 
right to articulate preference for childbirth by prohibiting clinics receiving federal 
Title X monies from counseling clients regarding abortion). It has been estimated 
that approximately nventy percent ofwomen in this country who want abortions can­
not get them due to poverty or inaccessibility of clinics which are located almost ex­
clusively in urban areas. According to the Alan Guttmacher Institute, by 1989, 83 
percent of counties in the United States had no doctors, clinics, or hospitals that 
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Thus, the Court concluded that there was a fundamental distinction 
between directly hindering or interfering with a woman's right to ac­
cess abortion services, and creating an affirmative obligation of the 
government to guarantee that all women could realize that right. By 
constructing the abortion right as an individual privacy right and as an 
individual private choice in Rne v. Wade, the Court in these later cases 
was able to ignore the issues of class and race. Because of poverty, 
those women with the fewest options and little to no discretionary re­
sources will not be able to exercise their "fundamental right" to 
abortion.130 
B. 	 The New Guard: Planned Parenthood ofSoutheastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey 
While the Court in Rne maintained that legislative interference 
with unfettered decisionmaking regarding abortion was presumptively 
invalid, the Court in Casey abandoned this presumption. The Casey 
Court held that only if a regulation places a substantial burden on a 
woman's right to have an abortion will it fail to meet a constitutional 
challenge. If the regulation is deem~d not to place a substantial or 
undue burden on the woman seeking to access abortion services, the 
reviewing court must assess the constitutional validity of the regula­
tion with a rational relationship review: determining whether the 
state's regulation is rationally related to the state's legitimate interest 
in preserving potential life. 131 In Casey, abortion clinics and physi­
cians challenged, on due process grounds, the constitutionality of a 
Pennsylvania abortion statute which included the following: a 
mandatory 24-hour waiting period; an informed consent provision, re­
quiring a physician to deliver a government-directed litany of informa­
tion including the availability of additional information providing in 
great detail the fetus' development, the possibility of state-funded pre­
natal care, and the liability of the man who impregnated the woman 
would perform abortions. BERNICE Lorr, WOMEN'S LIVES: THEMES AND VARIATIONS IN 
GENDER LEARNING 200 (2d ed. 1994). 
130. As Rosalind Petchesky notes: 

the denial of a collective or social basis ofwomen's need and right of access 

to abortion, its portrayal as a 'private choice' rather than a condition of a 

decent life, serves to perpetuate class divisions among women. In a class-di­

vided society, leaving individuals to their own private resources to secure a 

right means inevitably to exclude those who lack the resources. 

PETCHESKY, supra note 16, at 295; see generally Lorr, supra note 129, at 289-302. 
131. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820, 2821. Justice O'Connor first suggested this stan­
dard in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 453 
(1983) [hereinafter Akron 1] (O'Connor,]. dissenting); see also O'Connor's opinions 
in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproduc­
tive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) [hereinafter Akron fl]; Webster, 492 U.S. 490. In 
Akron I Justice O'Connor stated that a statute imposes an undue burden only if it 
imposes absolute obstacles or severe limitations. Akron I, 462 U.S. at 464 (O'Connor, 
]., dissenting). She has since moderated her position. 
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for child support; parental consent for minors; a reporting require­
ment which required information about each abortion to be reported 
to the state; and a spousal notification provision.132 
While calling abortion a fundamental right, 133 the Court in Casey 
destroyed the protections it had previously required.134 The Court 
rejected the trimester system of Rne, despite the fact that the Court in 
Rne v. Wade did not simply declare that abortion is a fundamental 
right, but also set up "a structure designed to protect that right from 
regulatory burdens that do not have a compellingjustification."135 In­
stead, the majority held that the trimester framework articulated in 
Rne was "a rigid prohibition on all pre-viability regulation aimed at the 
protection of fetal life."136 The Court found that the trimester frame­
work "misconceives the nature of the pregnant woman's interest; and 
in practice it undervalues the State's interest in potential life."137 The 
State, according to the court in Casey, has a substantial interest in the 
potential life of the fetus throughout the pregnancy.138 By rejecting 
the trimester structure, "Casey departed significantly enough from Rne 
to lessen its vaunted 'legitimacy.' Casey can be seen as just the kind of 
unprincipled politically opportune decision making made 'unnecessa­
rily and under pressure' that the majority claimed it wanted to 
avoid."139 
In rejecting the structure of protections set up by the Court in 
Rne, the Casey Court not only rejected the protections afforded by the 
trimester analysis ofRne, but also rejected the application ofstrict scru­
tiny traditionally applied in cases concerning fundamental rights. 
Strict scrutiny requires that the regulation in question be strictly nec­
essary to promote a compelling governmental interest. The Casey 
Court rejected this standard in favor of an intermediate form of re­
view. The Court's intermediate review is structured as an undue bur­
den test which questions whether a state regulation has the purpose 
or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seek­
132. See 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3205 (1990) -Appendix to Opinion in Casey, 
112 S. Ct. at 2833-38. 
133. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804. Fundamental rights are rights that the Court 
deems to be "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" or "implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty" so that "neither liberty norjustice would exist if they were 
sacrificed." Anita L. Allen, Autonomy'$ Magic Wand: Abortion and Constitutional Interpre­
tation, 72 B.U. L. REv. 683, 687 (1992); see also Moore v. City ofE. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 
494, 503 (1977); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937). 
134. Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2818. 
135. Rhonda Copelon, From Rhetoric to Reality: The Challenge of Casey, in REFLEc. 
TIONS AFrER CAsEY: WOMEN LOOK AT THE STATUS OF REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN AMERICA 
9, 10 (Center for Constitutional Rights 1993). 
136. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2818. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 2805. 
139. Allen, supra note 133, at 685 (footnotes omitted). 
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ing the abortion of a non-viable fetus. 140 The court stated, "A statute 
with this purpose is invalid because the means chosen by the state to 
further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the 
woman's free choice, not hinder it."141 An undue burden, as concep­
tualized by Justice O'Connor "is one that has a 'severe' or 'drastic' 
impact on the availability of legal abortion or absolutely vetoes a wo­
man's choice."142 
By significantly overruling the basic structures and prophesies of 
Roe, the Casey Court answered the previously unanswered question of 
"when is a fundamental right not a fundamental right?"143 The an­
swer is, when the fundamental right is abortion. Hence, regulations 
designed to foster the health of the pregnant woman or to persuade 
her to choose childbirth instead ofabortion are valid unless they erect 
a substantial obstacle to the exercise of the woman's right to choose 
abortion.144 Under this new constitutional framework, regulations 
that do not unduly burden a woman's right to access abortion services 
but rather are designed to persuade her to choose childbirth over 
abortion are analyzed under the reasonable relationship standard.145 
140. Martha Field has argued that the "establishment of this new constitutional 
framework with which to evaluate the constitutionality ofabortion regulation" is prob­
ably the most significant holding of Casey. See Martha Field, Abortion Law Today, 14]. 
LEGAL MED. 3, 12-13 (1993). 
The "unduly burdensome" standard of the Court seems to be more conclusory 
than a clearly articulated analytical framework. In their 1991 article, Mediating the 
Polar Extremes: A Guide to Post-Webster Policy, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REv. 403, 440, Richard 
Wilkins, Richard Sherlock, and Steven Clark speculated that three factors would influ­
ence the Court's decision of whether an abortion regulation is unduly burdensome. 
Wilkins et al. posit that in order for a regulation to avoid being found unduly burden­
some: (1) it must be firmly grounded in an articulated state interest; (2) it must not 
completely bar access to abortion services; and (3) it must actually further the articu­
lated state interest. Many scholars have argued that the unduly burdensome standard 
is inherently unworkable. Elizabeth A. Schneider, for example, asserts that the new 
standard is unworkable because it "invite[s] courts to ground their decisions in 
judges' subjective analysis. This becomes especially problematic when judges have 
limited knowledge about the availability of abortion" and because the test fails to 
assess each woman's individual needs in the unique situation of an abortion. Eliza­
beth A. Schneider, supra note 72, at 1031-34. 
141. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820; see also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 480 
(Kennedy,]. concurring in part and dissenting in part); 455 (Stevens,]., dissenting) 
(both noting that two-parent notification is not significantly burdensome); 460 
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
142. Law, Abortion Compromise, supra note 76, at 924; Thornburgh v. American 
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 828 (1986) (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
143. See PatriciaJ. Williams, Court Speak: When is a Fundamental Right Not a Funda­
mental Right?, Vlll.AGE VOICE, July 14, 1992 at 40. 
144. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821; see also Justice O'Connor's opinion in Akron v. 
Akron Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 453 (O'Connor,]., dissenting). 
145. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821. 
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C. Casey and the Prohibition ofSex-Se'lective Abartion 
What is at stake is the woman's right to make the ultimate decision,· not a 
right to be insulated from all others in doing so. &gulation which does no 
more than create a structural mechanism Uy which the state . . . may express 
profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a 
substantial obstac'le to the woman's exercise of the right to choose. 
-Justice 0 'Connor, PluraHty Opinion, 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 
In Casey, the Court once again reiterated that in the context of an 
abortion, the state has an interest in the potentiality of the life of the 
fetus. In reiterating this principle, the Court defined the state's inter­
est in the life of the fetus as "substantial," ~lowing the state to regulate 
abortion so long as the purpose or effect of the statute does not place 
a "substantial obstacle" in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of 
a non-viable fetus.146 Thus, the state may enact measures that are 
designed to persuade a woman to choose childbirth over abortion 
even if those measures are solely "persuasive" in nature and in no way 
further a health interest.147 However, the state may use only those 
means "calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not hinder 
it. "148 In applying the undue burden standard in Casey, the Court 
held that all of the challenged provisions, save one, passed constitu­
tional muster. 
In upholding the informed consent provision of the Pennsylvania 
statute, and overruling its earlier decisions in Akron v. Akron Centerfor 
Reproductive Health149 and Thornburgh v. American Col'lege ofObstetricians 
and Gynecowgists,150 the Casey Court found that the informed consent 
provision of the Pennsylvania statute furthers a legitimate state goal 
"of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only to 
discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her 
decision was not fully informed."151 As long as the information that 
the state requires to be made available to the woman is not mislead­
ing, the statute does not amount to an undue burden to a woman 
seeking an abortion.152 Consequently, as Anita Allen noted, Casey car­
ries on the process of dismissing the First Amendment rights of wo­
men seeking abortions and abortion providers by mandating what 
abortion providers must say to their patients.153 
146. Id. at 2820. 
147. Id. at 2825. 
148. Id. at 2820. 
149. 462 U.S. 416 (1983). 
150. 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
151. Case;, 112 S. Ct. at 2823. 
152. Id. at 2824. The Court's analysis here seems to follow the scheme presented 
by Wilkins, Sherlock, and Clark in their 1991 article. See supra note 140. 
153. The process of dismissing women's First Amendment rights in reference to 
abortion began with the Court's decision in Rust v. Sullivan. See discussion infra pp. 
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The relevant constitutional question in the context of sex-selec­
tive abortion is whether the state may forbid a woman from having 
access to certain information - namely the sex of her fetus - or 
forbid the consideration of this information, when she is deciding 
whether to obtain an abortion.154 In other words, would a prohibition 
on sex-selective abortion be an undue burden on the exercise of a 
woman's right to choose, given that such a prohibition would exclude 
the consideration of information that she deems relevant? Would 
such a measure be calculated to inform the woman's individual choice 
or to impede it?l55 
1. Restricting Knowledge of the Fetus' Sex 
In upholding the informed consent provision of the statute, the 
Court in Casey held that a state could require a woman to take certain 
information into account when deciding whether to obtain an abor­
tion. This decision seems to be in line with some of the principles of 
our First Amendmentjurisprudence, which disregards free speech im­
plications of state abortion restrictions.156 Information is deemed a 
benefit: the more information the better. The Court stresses that in­
formational requirements lead to better decisions for all women.157 
Earlier, however, in Rust v. Sullivan15B the Court upheld as consti­
tutional a federal regulation which forbade physicians or other em­
ployees of family planning clinics that received Title X159 funds from 
counseling pregnant patients about the option of abortion.160 The 
regulation, no longer in effect, limited many poor women's access to 
abortion information, but was not viewed by the Court as impermissi­
bly restricting the "speech" of the physicians, other clinic employees, 
or their pregnant patients, by imposing viewpoint discriminatory con­
ditions on government subsidies, or impermissibly restricting a wo­
man's right to procure abortion services. According to the Court, the 
regulation was constitutional because physicians remained free to 
counsel patients about abortion outside of the government-funded 
clinic and because all women are "free" to obtain advice and counsel­
ing from a physician or other health care worker not restricted by the 
194-96; see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Rust v. Sullivan and the Control of Knowl.edge, 61 
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 587 (1993); Allen, supra note 133, at 691-92. 
154. See discussion of Pennsylvania and Illinois statutes supra p. 163-64. 
155. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820. 
156. See Allen, supra note 133, at 691-92. 
157. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2823. 
158. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). 
159. Title X of the Public Health SeIVice Act, 84 Stat. 1506, as amended, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 300-300a-6, provides federal funding for family planning seIVices. Section 
1008 of the Act provides that "[n]one of the funds appropriated under this sub­
chapter shall be used in programs where abortion is a method offamily planning." 42 
U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1989). 
160. Regulation Governing Grants for Family Planning SeIVices, 42 C.F.R 
§§ 59.2, 59.8, 59.10 (1988). 
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regulation. With regard to the free speech rights of physicians and 
other clinic employees, the Court stated: 
Individuals who are voluntarily employed for a Title X project must 
perform their duties in accordance with the regulation's restrictions 
on abortion counseling and referral. The employees remain free, 
however, to pursue abortion-related activities when they are not act­
ing under the auspices of the Title X project. ... The employees' 
freedom of expression is limited during the time that they actually 
work for the project; but this limitation is a consequence of their 
decision to accept employment in a project, the scope of which is 
permissibly restricted by the funding authority.161 
The Court in Rust reasoned that because the restrictions did not affect 
all women and physicians, but only those who relied on the govern­
ment subsidized clinics, and because this reliance was due solely to the 
woman's poverty or to the physician's choice of employment - "ob­
stacles" not of the government's making - these restrictions did not 
unduly burden the woman's choice.162 Moreover, the Court stressed 
that the regulation at issue was just another way by which the govern­
ment may " 'make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, 
and . . . implement that judgment by the allocation of public 
funds.' "163 This allocation of resources, the Court reasoned, is not 
viewpoint discrimination; rather, it is merely the encouragement of 
one activity to the exclusion of another.164. 
Denying access to full information concerning her fetus may be 
viewed as burdensome by a woman who wishes to factor the sex ofher 
fetus into her abortion decision. However, application of the undue 
burden standard as articulated in Casey would probably yield a verdict 
of no "undue" burden or substantial obstacle. By not allowing a wo­
man to factor the sex of the fetus into her decision, or to abort on the 
basis of the sex of her fetus, or by blocking her access to sex informa­
tion gathered by amniocentesis or CVS, the State would not be plac­
ing obstacles in the path of a woman who wishes to have an abortion. 
The woman would still be permitted to abort her fetus; she would only 
be unable to factor the sex of her fetus into the decision.165 Prohibit­
ing access to fetal sex information could be simply another way in 
161. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1775. 
162. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1778; see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315, 317; 
Maher v. Rne, 432 U.S. 464, 474. President Clinton responded to this "gag rule" with 
"The Title X 'Gag Rule' Memorandum for the Secretary ofHealth and Human Serv­
ices," January 22, 1993, which removed the restrictions from family planning clinics 
receiving Title X funds. 
163. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1772 (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 474). 
164. Id. 
165. John Schaibley makes this point in his analysis of Planned Parenthood v. 
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976). Schaibley, supra note 10, at 303 ("A state regulation 
of abortion is not constitutionally infirm merely because it makes the abortion deci­
sion more difficult. Indeed the informed consent requirement upheld in Danforth 
was designed to influence a woman's abortion decision and could discourage a wo­
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which the state may permissibly encourage childbirth over abortion: 
that is, by effectively discouraging women from aborting in fear that 
they will mistakenly abort a fetus of the "correct" sex. 
Yet, would such a statute or regulation be "calculated to inform 
the woman's free choice," as required by the Court in Casey, or 
designed to hinder the exercise of free choice?166 The statute at issue 
in Casey, as construed by the Court, was designed to "create a struc­
tural mechanism by which the State ... may express profound respect 
for the life of the [fetus] ,"167 and to persuade the pregnant woman to 
choose childbirth over abortion.168 The Court found the informed 
consent provision constitutional because the measure did not create a 
"substantial obstacle" to the exercise of her right of choice. The wo­
man could still choose abortion, so there is no hinderance of her ex­
ercise of "free choice."169 By "choice," the Court seems to refer to 
whether or not the regulation creates a substantial obstacle to ob­
taining an abortion somewhere.170 "Choice" does not mean that the 
pregnant woman has at her disposal as much or as little information 
as she wants. Clearly, the lesson of Casey and Rust is that the state can 
regulate what types of information, if any, pregnant women receive 
regarding abortion. Pregnant women may be given too much infor­
mation - designed to encourage them to choose childbirth - or no 
information - again designed to encourage them to choose child­
birth. As long as the pregnant woman still has the "choice" ofwhether 
or not to abort, the quality and amount of the information she re­
ceives is constitutionally unimportant. The State may prevent sex-se­
lective abortions by prohibiting doctors from informing pregnant 
women and their partners of the fetus' sex if the doctors know that 
the information is sought for the purposes of sex-selection. This type 
of regulation could be viewed as a means of "encouraging" childbirth 
over abortion (that is, because the state believes that women who want 
sex-selective abortion will not abort for fear of aborting the wanted 
sex). A prohibition of this type would not act as an obstacle to the 
"ultimate decision" of whether to abort. 17 1 
man from having an abortion, but the Court did not consider this an undue 
burden."). 
166. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820. 
167. Id. at 2821. 
168. Id. at 2824. 
169. In Rust, the Court held that the "gag rule" at issue did not impermissibly 
burden a woman's constitutional right to abortion because the Due Process Clauses of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not confer an affirmative right to govern­
mental aid. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1776. 
170. Similarly, the Court in Rust reasoned that women's due process rights were 
not violated by the agency's regulations because "a woman's right to receive informa­
tion concerning abortion and abortion-related services outside the context of the Ti­
tle X project remains unfettered." Id. at 1777. 
171. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821. 
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2. The Mandatory Waiting Period and the Spousal 
Notification Requirements 
The Court in Casey also analyzed the Pennsylvania law's twenty­
four hour waiting period provision, which required a woman seeking 
an abortion to wait uventy-four hours after the required information is 
furnished to her. The Court held that the provision did not cause an 
undue burden and, hence, was a constitutionally permissible provi­
sion. In contrast, the spousal notification provision, which required a 
pregnant woman to notify her spouse of her decision to abort her 
fetus, was held unduly burdensome and therefore unconstitutional. 
With regard to the uventy-four hour waiting period, the Court found 
that the waiting period was a "reasonable measure to implement the 
State's interest in protecting the life of the [fetus],"172 despite the fact 
that the regulation would cause hardships to women who had to travel 
a great distance to the abortion provider, forcing them to explain 
their whereabouts to husbands, employers and others; increase the 
costs and the risk of delay of abortions; and pose the greatest burden 
on women who had the fewest financial resources.173 The Court held 
that the district court's findings of fact, that the waiting period was 
"particularly burdensome," did not include a finding that the in­
creased costs and potential delays amount to "substantial obstacles" to 
abortion:174 
We also disagree with the District Court's conclusion that the "par­
ticularly burdensome" effects of the waiting period on some women 
require its invalidation. A particular burden is not of necessity a 
substantial obstacle. Whether a burden falls on a particular group is 
a distinct inquiry from whether it is a substantial obstacle even as to 
the women in that group. And the District Court did not conclude 
that the waiting period is such an obstacle even for the women who 
are the most burdened by it.175 
The Court thereby maintained that although poor women in Penn­
sylvania may be foreclosed from having an abortion, the mandatory 
172. Id. at 2825. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun noted the District Court's find­
ings that requiring a doctor, rather than an assistant, to give the patient the requisite 
informed consent materials increased the cost of the abortion, making it even more 
financially burdensome for poor women. Id. at 2850 (Blackmun, J., concurring in 
part, concurring in the judgment, and dissenting in part); see also Schneider, supra 
note 72, at 1024-25 ("increased cost of the physician-only requirement literally puts 
abortion out of [poor women's] financial reach"}. 
173. The District Court found that the twenty-four hour waiting period was "par­
ticularly burdensome." Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
744 F.Supp. 1323, 1352 (1990). 
174. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2825. 
175. Id. at 2825-26. The Supreme Court in Casey did not explain why there is a 
significant difference between a finding of "particularly'' burdensome as found by the 
District Court, and "especially" or "substantially" burdensome as required by the 
Court. Of course, the District Court could not have known that the "magic words" 
were going to be "unduly burdensome". 
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waiting period "merely makes abortions a little more difficult or expen­
sive to obtain. "176 Hence, it is not the waiting period that causes the 
obstacle and forecloses access to abortion services for poor women, 
but their poverty. It is poor women's lack of financial resources that 
makes them unable to effectuate this right.177 
At first glance, the Court's analysis of Pennsylvania's mandatory 
waiting period, as well as the Court's decisions in analogous abortion 
funding cases, is supported by the theoretical underpinnings of pri­
vacy and the Court's autonomy rhetoric. The abortion right is con­
ceived as a purely personal or individual right. The funding cases, as 
well as the Court's decision regarding the mandatory waiting periods 
in Casey, seem to logically extend this understanding of liberty - as 
rights that are exercised solely by the citizen using the citizen's own 
resources. As Pamela Karlan and Daniel Ortiz have noted, "[abor­
tion] is a private decision in a dual sense: the state cannot interfere 
and the woman cannot invoke state aid."178 But ifKarlan and Ortiz 
are correct in their assessment of the Court's conceptualization of the 
liberty interest, then if the state is permitted to interfere with the wo­
man's autonomy and her decisionmaking, the woman should be able 
to invoke more state resources to protect her interests. The Court's 
opinion in Casey clearly allows for increased state intervention in a 
pregnant woman's decision to abort her fetus. The decreased level of 
constitutional scrutiny permits more state intervention. After Casey 
the abortion decision is no longer a private one - the state signifi­
cantly interferes inter alia by prescribing waiting periods and informa­
tional requirements. Accordingly, the woman should be able to 
depend on state assistance in securing access to the right, particularly 
given that the state has forced the woman to spend more of her re­
sources to exercise her rights. I doubt that the Court's abortion juris­
prudence will confront this theoretical inconsistency, but this 
inconsistency is further evidence of the Court's politically opportune 
decision making.179 
Regarding the spousal notification provision, the Court relied on 
the overwhelming data of domestic violence against women in the 
United States, and held the spousal notification provision unconstitu­
tional because it is likely to prevent a significant number of women 
from obtaining abortions. The Court believed that this provision 
176. Id. at 2829 (emphasis added). 
177. In a post-Casey abortion case, the Court has tried to flesh out the parameters 
of the undue burden standard. For example, in Fargo Women '.s Health Organization v. 
Schafer, Justice O'Connor in her concurrence noted that the Court in Casey "made 
clear that a law restricting abortions is invalid, if 'in a large fraction of cases in which 
[the law] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice.'" 
Fargo Women's Health Organization v. Schafer, 113 S. Ct. 1668, 1669 (1993) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). 
178. Pamela S. Karlan & Daniel R. Ortiz, In a Diffident Voice: Relational Feminism, 
Abortion Rights, and the Feminist Legal Agenda, 87 Nw. U. L. R.E.v. 858, 879 (1993). 
179. See, Williams, supra note 143, at 40. 
1995] A FEMINIST UNDERSTANDING OF SEX-SELECTIVE ABORTION 199 
"[did] not make abortions a little more difficult or expensive to ob­
tain; for many women, it imposed a substantial obstacle."180 Although 
the State argued that the provision would affect only 1 percent of the 
women who obtain abortions in the Commonwealth of Penn­
sylvania,181 the Court found this fact insignificant, noting that the 
"proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law 
is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant. "182 The 
Court suggested that the number of actual women who will be bur­
dened by the statute is inconsequential, so long as a large fraction of 
the relevant group of women will be unduly burdened. Nevertheless, 
the Court did not use this reasoning when applying its new standard 
to the mandatory waiting period.183 Instead, the Court declared that 
although the opportunity for access by large numbers of women may 
be foreclosed as a result of the waiting period, the waiting period was 
not unduly burdensome because it only increased the external costs. 
Hence the Court's substantial burden test is both inconsistent and 
contradictory. It appears that what is required is the formalistic decla­
ration by the district court that the particular burden, falling on a 
particular group of women, is a substantial obstacle184 and that the 
obstacle is not caused by poverty or other financial constraints. By 
defining the obstacle posed by the mandatory waiting period as solely 
financial,185 the Court disregards the fact that many women will be 
unable to receive abortions due to the restrictions. 
3. Casey and Sex-Selective Abortion 
The remaining issues are whether the Court's analysis in Casey 
relates to the issue of sex-selective abortion and whether the Court 
may (or is likely to) allow states to limit women's access to information 
concerning fetal sex. In Casey, the social science data relied upon by 
the Court in testing the constitutionality of the spousal notification 
provision was statistical evidence about the abuse of women by their 
spouses which has already occurred and continues to occur. The 
abuse has already been "proven." In contrast, the sociological data 
regarding sex-selective abortion speaks to predictions which can only 
be "proven" or "unproven" at some time in the future. In other 
words, the validity of sociological predictions is indeterminate. Inde­
180. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2829. 
181. Brief for Robert Casey at 83-86, Planned Parenthood ofSoutheastern Penn­
sylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
182. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2829. 
183. Id. at 2829-30. The meaning of "large fraction" and "relevant group" are 
unclear, and as a result, manipulatable. See id. at 2848 (Blackmun, J. concurring in 
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part); id. at 2877 (Scalia, 
]., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
184. See id. at 2819-20. (Court's re-writing of district court's "particularly burden­
some" finding.) 
185. See Court's discussion in Harris, 448 U.S. at 316-17 and Maher, 432 U.S. at 
474. 
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terminate speculative outcomes are discountable by the Court.186 If 
the new doctrine articulated by the Court in Casey requires that the 
state regulation of abortion must actually further the articulated state 
interest, as Wilkins, Sherlock and Clark suggest, 187 then the sociologi­
cal predictions fall short of that standard. 
In Casey, the Court seemed to give weight to "external" obstacles 
which are not economic in nature. In discussing the spousal notifica­
tion provision, the Court seriously considered and deemed relevant 
the ways in which some social conditions, such as domestic violence, 
affect a woman's ability to access the right to abortion. The Court was 
swayed by the district court's findings regarding the prevalence of 
spouse abuse.188 That a "significant number of women who fear for 
their safety and the safety of their children are likely to be deterred 
from procuring an abortion" if they are required to notify their 
spouses, constitutes a substantial burden.189 Like the sociological data 
on spouse abuse, the sociological data concerning sex-selective abor­
tion is not based on the issues of class or the availability of financial 
resources. After Casey, the question remains whether the analysis of 
what constitutes a "substantial" obstacle examines the conditions 
under which a decision is made, like the mandatory waiting period 
and the spousal notification provision, or looks at what motivates the 
decision itself.190 
Although the right of privacy with regard to abortion can mean 
the protection of one's sovereignty over personal decisions,191 the pri­
vacy doctrine provides an inadequate basis for understanding abor­
tion decisions generally and sex-selective abortion in particular. The 
privacy doctrine argues for the support of abortion on the basis of 
freedom from unwarranted state intrusion in one's sphere of individ­
ual discretion. It does not argue for abortion on the basis ofwomens' 
right to reproductive control,192 bodily integrity, freedom of sexual 
expression, or the right to equality. By operating in the realm of the 
private sphere, the privacy doctrine obscures the political nature of 
the private sphere193 where women are often beaten, raped or other­
wise sexually coerced, including coerced into producing male chil­
186. See supra note 86. 
187. See supra note 140. 
188. The District Court's findings were based on the testimony of numerous ex­
perts at the trial and other studies of domestic violence which demonstrate that a 
significant number of married women are physically and emotionally abused by their 
spouses. Casey, 744 F.Supp. at 1332-33. 
189. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2829. 
190. See]oN EI.STER, NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SocIAL SCIENCES 13-21 (1989). 
191. Ronald Dworkin, Feminism and Abortion, N.Y. REv. BooKS 27, 27 (June 10, 
1993). 
192. But see Court's opinion in Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807. 
193. But see Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2806. (Court implies that the abortion right is 
based on the notion that states have a limited ability to interfere in basic decisions 
about family and parenthood, as well as the bodily integrity of the pregnant woman.). 
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dren for their husbands and farnilies.194 This conception of nghts 
protects behavior that is arbitrary or even InJUnous provided that the 
mJunous behavior falls m the protected sphere.195 In the context of 
abortion for the purpose of sex-selection, the pnvacy nghts doctnne 
does not take mto account the harms done to women's mdividual or 
social goals of gender equality. 
IV FEMINSIMS AND EQUAL PROTECI'ION APPROACHES To 
SEX-SELECI'ION 
I will never be in a man's place, a man will never be in mine. Whateoer 
the possibl,e identifications, one will never exactly occupy the p!,ace of the 
other - they are irreducibl,e the one to the other. 
-LUCE IRIGARAY, ETHIQ.llE .DE LA .DIFFERENCE SEXllELLE 
19-20 (1984). 
Fermmsts are not a homogeneous group even though we are all 
gmded by similar moral and philosophical pnnc1ples and share the 
goals of gender equality and JUStice. Hence, there is no smgle fem1­
mst analysis of any polittcal, legal, or social issue, mcluding sex-selec­
ttve abortion. In this sectton I shall discuss the tradittonal approach of 
the equal protectton doctnne to issues related to women's biological 
difference from men and fermmst proposals of alternattve equal pro­
tectton approaches. I shalll also analyze liberal and radical femm1st 
evaluattons ofsex-selecttve abortion under these alternattve equal pro­
tectton frameworks. 
A. A Note on Traditional Equal Protection Analysis 
Fermmst scholars from across the polittcal spectrum have cntt­
c1zed tradittonal equal protectton doctnne because of its failure to 
protect women from the harms of many gender-based discnrmnatory 
laws which mvolve women's capacity to become pregnant, gestate the 
fetus, or termmate a pregnancy. Traditional equal protectton analysis 
seeks to treat alike those who are alike, and allow differenttal treat­
ment of those who are not similarly situated. Since women are not 
like men when it comes to true biological differences, such as the abil­
ity to conceive and bear children, laws that treat women differently 
often pass constttutional muster under the tradittonal analysis.196 The 
194. See generally SuSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OuR WILL. MEN, WOMEN, AND 
RAPE (1975). 
195. See generally, ROBERTO UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 7 
(1986). 
196. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1973), is a pnme example of the Court's 
reasoning on the issue ofgender equality and the equal protectton doctnne. At issue 
m Geduldigwas a California disability insurance program which covered workers tem­
porarily disabled by illness or Injury. Electtve surgery was covered under the policy, as 
were disabilities umque to men, but disability related to a normal pregnancy was not. 
The Court held that the program was not 1mpermissibly discnminatory under the 
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goal of traditional equal protection analysis is assimilation: to the ex­
tent that women are able to be like men (since the standard for equal 
treatment is maleness),197 they are similarly situated and therefore 
should be treated equally - not discriminated against.198 Under this 
test, the biological fact that women get pregnant and men do not 
equal protection clause. The Court concluded that there was no risk from which 
women were protected and men were not. Id. at 496-97. The majority insisted that 
the California program did not exclude anyone from eligibility for benefits because of 
their gender, but rather "merely removes one physical condition-pregnancy-from 
the list of compensable disabilities," dividing potential recipients in two groups: preg­
nant women and nonpregnant persons. Id. at 496 n.20. Cf. Michael M. v. Sonoma 
County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (Statutory rape law effectively allowed men to legally 
engage in sexual intercourse at an earlier age than women based on notion that con­
sequences of sexual intercourse for women is different). 
By allowing the California disability program to cover disabilities that were male 
gender specific while not covering pregnancy, a condition that is female gender spe­
cific, the Court implicitly declared that the standard is male. See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 
497 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In other words, the Court's acceptance of the insur­
ance program which covered conditions that were specifically male, such as circumci­
sions, and not pregnancy, is indicative of the Court's use of men as the standard to 
which others are compared when deciding issues of equality and equal protection. See 
generally Ann Scales, Toward a Feminist jurisprudence, 56 IND. LJ. 375, 435 (1981) (uni­
queness of women is a trap in equal protection analysis which assumes maleness as a 
norm); Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special 
Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1984) (pregnancy has been 
negatively treated because it is an ascension into "no man's land." Normal-male­
like-status for women is non-pregnant). 
After the Court announced its decisions in Geduldig, and a factually similar Title 
VII case, General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), Congress passed the Preg­
nancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(K) (1982), which prohibited this 
type of discrimination under Title VII; but note, Geduldig is still good constitutional 
law. For a fuller analysis of this issue see, e.g., Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, 
Women 'S Subordination and the Role of Law, in PERSPECTIVES ON WOMEN'S SuBORDINA· 
TION AND THE ROLE OF LAw (David Kairys ed., 1990) (Taub and Schneider note that in 
Michael M., "the Court's focus on the physical fact of reproductive capacity serves to 
obscure the social bases of its decision. Indeed, it is striking that the Court entirely 
fails to treat pregnancy as sex-discrimination when discrimination really is in issue, 
while using it as a rationale in order to justify differential treatment when it is not in 
issue."). 
197. Catharine MacKinnon makes this point when she states: 

Under the sameness standard, women are measured according to our corre­

spondence with man, our equality judged by our proximity to his measure. 

Under the difference standard, we are measured according to our lack of 

correspondence with him, our womanhood judged by our distance from his 

measure. Gender neutrality is thus simply the male standard ... Approach­

ing sex discrimination in this way-as if sex questions are difference ques­

tions and equality questions are sameness questions-provides two ways for 

the law to hold women to a male standard and call that sex equality. 

CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMI­
NISM UNMODIFIED 34 (1987). 
198. See ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE LAw 66-67 (1988); 
CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, THE SEXUAL lIARAsSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CAsE OF 
SEx DISCRIMINATION (1979) [hereinafter SEXUAL lIARAssMENT]; CATHARINE A. MAcKIN­
NON, FEMINISM UNMODIDED (1987). 
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makes discrimination permissible. Hence, laws biased against preg­
nant women are not viewed as gender discrimination; instead, they 
have been understood as laws that are neutral.199 In the context of 
reproduction, the sexes are not similarly situated and thus equal pro­
tection and treatment principles simply are not applicable.200 In addi­
tion, under its current equal protection jurisprudence, the Court 
ignores the "context" of discrimination based on women's capacity to 
reproduce. Historically, legislation limiting women's rights regarding 
reproduction, including abortion, have been enmeshed in society's 
conception ofwomen as mothers.201 Equal protection seeks to either 
impose generality in law or to correct for generalities in law that im­
pede individuals from exercising discretion in determining the course 
of their lives.202 It does not seek to correct for trends in social prac­
tices that tend to pose difficulties for individuals or groups based on 
commonly held views about them. Hence, by validating differential 
and discriminatory treatment toward women as a result of women's 
capacity for childbearing, and confusing the differences between wo­
men's biological difference from men and the gendered expectations 
society holds for women, the Court continues to legitimize gender ine­
quality. Due to its foundational structures and philosophy, traditional 
equal protection analysis is inadequate to address the issue of sex-se­
lective abortion. 
B. Feminist Approaches to the Equal Protection Clause 
Many feminist scholars have rejected the assimilationism of the 
traditional model of equal protection, and have instead argued for a 
framework which moves closer to the goal of gender equality. They 
have rejected the anti-discrimination model of equal protection and 
The current level ofequal protection review for issues ofgender discrimination is 
intermediate or heightened scrutiny, which means that the government's regulation 
must be substantially related to an important governmental interest. This standard 
was first applied in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), a case involving a statute 
which permitted women to buy and drink 3.2 percent beer at an earlier age than 
men. The statute was struck down under intermediate scrutiny. See generally LAU­
RENCE A. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1561-65 (2d ed. 1988) (tracing the 
development of heightened review standard for gender discrimination). 
199. EISENSTEIN, supra note 198, at 66. 
200. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 
100 YALE L. REv. 1281, 1287-88 (1991) [hereinafter Reflections on Sex Equality] (issues 
of sexual violence and reproduction not considered equal protection issues or issues 
of sex inequality by early feminists); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic ofRights and 
Politics: Perspectives from the Women '.s- Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589, 634-42 (1986) 
[hereinafter The Dialectic ofRights and Politics]; Reva Siegel, Reasoningfrom the Body: A 
Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Qy,estions ofEqual Protection, 44 STAN. L. 
REv. 261, 352-53 (1992) [hereinafter Reasoningfrom the Body] (equal protection clause 
as currently construed places no restraints on state regulation of women's reproduc­
tive lives). 
201. See Siegel, supra note 200, at 351; see also RICH, supra note 75 at 41-55. 
202. See UNGER, supra note 195, at 44-45. 
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have substituted models based on anti-subordination. As Reva Siegel 
has noted, a growing number of constitutional scholars have argued 
that equal protection analysis should be reoriented "so that it directly 
consider[s] the impact of state action on the citizens affected by it."203 
The fundamental principle of feminist equal protection models is this 
paradigm shift from anti-discrimination to anti-subordination. The 
anti-subordination principle is that women deserve equality and jus­
tice whether or not they are like men. The proponents of these mod­
els assert that the legal and social discrimination, the differential 
treatment that women face, "has left [us] dissimilarly situated from 
men with regard to any number of traits typically addressed by dis­
criminatory laws. Rather than excusing the differential treatment as 
the traditional equal protection doctrine suggests, this disparity is sim­
ply another symptom of the discrimination that women face. "2°4 
Catharine MacKinnon has developed such a feminist equal pro­
tection model.205 Under her approach, any statute, regulation, rule 
or practice which "contributes to the maintenance of an underclass or 
a deprived position because of gender status" would be constitution­
ally impermissible as a violation of the equal protection clause.206 
Under MacKinnon's analysis: 
The social problem addressed is not the failure to ignore woman's 
essential sameness with man, but the recognition ofwomanhood to 
woman's comparative disadvantage. In this approach, few reasons, 
not even biological ones, can justify the institutionalized disadvan­
tage ofwomen. Comparability of sex characteristics is not required 
because policies are proscribed which transform women's sex-based 
difference from men into social and economic deprivations. All 
that is required are comparatively unequal results.207 
Application ofMacKinnon's approach requires an analysis ofwhether 
the law or regulation at issue preserves women's economic, social, and 
political subordination. 
While many feminist scholars have adopted MacKinnon's ap­
proach to equal protection problems, Sylvia Law has criticized it for 
improperly presuming that judges will be able to recognize, and find 
203. Siegel, supra note 200, at 368. This paradigm shift is often referred to as the 
anti-subordination model of equal protection jurisprudence. See infra note 248. 
204. Catherine Grevers Schmidt, Where Privacy Fails: Equal Protection and the Abar­
tion Ri,ghts ofMinors, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 597, 611 (1993) (citations omitted). 
205. MacKinnon first articulated the parameters of the new approach to equal 
protection in SEXUAL liARAssMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CAsE OF SEX DISCRIMINA­
TION (1979). See also MAcKINNON, TowARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra 
note 105, at 215-34. As Catherine Grevers Schmidt notes, many feminist legal schol­
ars have adopted a "MacKinnonesque" equal protection test. See Schmidt, supra note 
204, at 617 n.124. 
206. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL liARAssMENT, supra note 205, at 117. 
207. Id.; see also id. at 127. 
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unconstitutional, laws that oppress women.208 Law is concerned that 
MacKinnon's framework unrealistically relies on the subjective and 
personal experience of judges to know the oppression of women 
when they see it209 In response, Sylvia Law has created an alternative 
feminist equal protection formulation that also focuses on the impact 
of the law or regulation at issue. However, her formulation applies 
only to laws or regulations that are explicitly based on women's bio­
logical difference from men because she believes that such laws are 
conceptually similar to the types of racially discriminatory categories 
that are judged by means of strict scrutiny analysis under the tradi­
tional equal protection doctrine. Pregnancy, like race, is a facial clas­
sification.210 Under Law's analysis, the court must ascertain whether 
the regulation has a "significant impact in perpetuating either the op­
pression of women or culturally imposed sex-role constraints on indi­
vidual freedom"211 and whether "it is justified as the best means of 
serving a compelling state purpose."212 Thus under Law's equal pro­
tection test, the state has the burden ofjustifying its law in light of the 
history ofwomen's subjugation based on their reproductive capacities 
only when the regulation is explicitly based on biological sex. 213 Of 
course the problem with this analysis is that it gives women no re­
course when the bias they face is due to their gender. Much discrimi­
nation against women is based on gender as socially constructed, and 
not on biological sex. Indeed, courts and legislatures often confuse 
the social construction of women with their biological abilities.214 
Hence Law's analysis permits much of the bias that women face, par­
ticularly in the reproductive arena, to evade an equal protection 
challenge. 
C. A Liberal Feminist Equal Protection Analysis ofSex-Selection 
In the United States, classic liberalism has as its foundation the 
political principle ofliberty: the right of the individual (read male) to 
be free from undue government interference in his personal, familial 
and business affairs, except where government interference protects 
208. Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 1005, 
1011 (1984) [hereinafter &thinking Sex and the Constitution]. 
209. Id. at 1005. Elizabeth A. Schneider makes a similar point in her critique of 
the undue burden standard articulated by the Court in Casey, see supra note 72, at 
1004, 1031-33. 
210. Law, &thinking Sex and the Constitution, supra note 208, at 1008, 1010. 
211. This part ofLaw's analysis is subject to the same criticism that Law makes of 
MacKinnon's analysis - that the analysis relies on the same type ofsubjective analysis 
of the judge, and that the regulation at issue oppresses women. Law seeks to cure this 
weakness by insisting that all biologically-based laws are presumed to be oppressive to 
women. Id. at 1009. 
212. Id. at 1008-09. 
213. Id. at 1009. 
214. See e.g., MacKinnon, &factions on Sex Equality Under Law, supra note 200, at 
1308-09; RrCH, supra note 75, at 21-40. 
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private property and business interests in the public sphere and male 
control of the biological family in the private sphere. Some principles 
of liberalism - that is, the worship of individuality and autonomy ­
are accepted by women espousing a liberal feminist political position. 
The liberal feminist generally accepts the validity of a political theory 
which puts a premium on individual power and discretion, but argues 
that liberalism, as practiced in the United States, excludes women 
from fully realizing these goals. Consequently, the liberal feminist ad­
vocates for formal legal equality between men and women, as well as 
equal educational, economic, and employment opportunities. Liberal 
feminists believe that through legal equality and equal access of op­
portunities, women will be provided with the needed opportunities 
for full participation in public life as promised by liberal political the­
ory. Thus liberal feminism's vision of equality for women is a commit­
ment to equality between men and women based on the sameness of 
treatment and equal opportunity, without any analysis of the social/ 
cultural relationship of power that exists between men and women. 
As Zillah Eisenstein has written: 
The discourse of liberalism, which espouses a commitment to 
equality for all individuals, articulates an important and necessary 
view regarding the treatment of women. The fact that liberalism 
has always privileged the phallus and the social relations of patriar­
chal society explains why the tension between women's similarity 
(to) and difference (from men) is embodied within liberal law. As a 
gendered discourse, liberal law ends up exposing the phallus, be­
cause in its view men and women are supposedly homogeneous in­
dividuals and not sex classes. Liberalism thus establishes the 
expectation that women will be treated as individuals, not as wo­
men, classified by their sex. 215 
In the reproductive arena, liberal feminists advocate for repro­
ductive liberty on the grounds of personal autonomy (again a founda­
tional aspect of classic liberalism) and the protection of privacy, that 
is, freedom from unwarranted government intrusion into the private 
sphere.216 As a result, liberal feminists argue against legal prohibi­
215. EISENSTEIN, supra note 198, at 77 (emphasis in original). 
216. See Doe, 410 U.S. at 213-15. J.S. Mill, Harriet Taylor Mill, and Mary Woll­
stonecraft are three important figures in the early articulation ofliberal feminism. In 
A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WoMAN (Carol H. Poston ed., 1988), Mary Woll­
stonecraft, in 1792, argues for the right ofwomen to a quality, equal education. J.S. 
Mill and Harriet Taylor Mill in the mid-19th century advocated both formal legal 
equality and equal educational opportunities. See, e.g., HAfuuET TAYLOR MILL, EN­
FRANCHISEMENT OF WOMEN (1851) (advocating equal education; equal access to occu­
pations and equal access to public office and public/political life, as well as suffrage); 
J.S. Mill & Harriet Taylor, Early Essays on Marriage and Divorce, inJ.S. MILL AND HAR­
RIET TAYLOR MILL, ESSAY ON SEX EQUALITY (Alice S. Rossi ed., 1970) (advocating mar­
riage and divorce reform). Cf. Randy E. Barnett, supra note 67, at 628. Barnett, in 
discussing natural rights which is at the heart of liberalism, explains: 
For persons to live and pursue happiness in society with others, persons 
need to act at their own discretion. This is made possible by recognizing a 
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tions on sex-selective abortion. The principles of liberalism and lib­
eral feminism demand that each individual woman be permitted to 
make choices regarding the continuation of her pregnancy using 
whatever criteria she wishes. Prohibitions against sex-selective abor­
tion are in conflict with these principles. There is also some concern 
in feminist circles across the political spectrum that because the right 
to access abortion services is so precarious in the United States, any 
prohibitions on the abortion right would irreparably weaken that 
right. Feminist philosopher Tabitha Powledge is one scholar who has 
forcefully voiced this position: "To make it illegal to use prenatal diag­
nostic techniques for sex choice is to nibble away at our hard-won 
reproductive control, control that I think most of us believe is the 
absolute rock-bottom minimum goal we have got to keep achieved 
before we can achieve anything else."217 
This view is supported by a consequentialist philosophical ap­
proach which focuses on the consequences of a decision to prohibit 
abortion for the purpose of sex-selection on both the current and fu­
ture generations of women.218 In this form of consequentialist in­
quiry, a good moral decision is one that takes into account the moral 
and social consequences of an act. A liberal feminist analysis, adopt­
ing a consequentialist philosophical approach, would argue that the 
social consequences of a legal prohibition of sex-selective abortion 
would be the reinforcment of women's subordinate status and the 
denigration of women as irresponsible decisionmakers, which would 
"nibble away at our hard won reproductive control." The overriding 
consequence of a prohibition on sex-selective abortion according to 
liberal feminism would be the constriction of women's autonomy, 
which is in direct opposition to liberal feminism's beliefin the impor­
tance of preserving legal rules which embody a view of women as re­
sponsible adults. 219 As a result, many liberal feminists have turned to 
equal protection law as a source of potential protection against any 
sphere ofjurisdiction over physical resources - including their own bodies 
- that provides persons with discretionary control - liberty - over these 
resources. Put another way, persons need to be at liberty to act within the 
realm of their jurisdiction - a jurisdiction that has both temporal and spa­
tial dimensions. 
217. Tabitha M. Powledge, Unnatural Selection: On Choosing Children sSex, in THE 
CUSTOM MADE CHn.o?, supra note 2, 193, at 197; see also WARREN, supra note 4, at 183; 
Hoskins & Holmes, supra note 2, at 245 (sex-selection is simply a more sophisticated 
method of family planning and any legal restriction on family planning also jeopar­
dizes other aspects of women's precarious reproductive futures); Hetcher, Ethics and 
Amnwcentesis for Fetal Sex Identificatron, 301 NEW ENG.J. MED. 550 (1979), reprinted in 10 
HAsnNGs CENTER REP. 15, 15-16 (Feb. 1980) (to employ public or medical tests of 
women's decision to abo~ provides opportunities for obstruction and defeat of wo­
men's freedom to determine their own reproductive futures). 
218. See discussion supra pp. 178-81. 
219. For a fuller discussion of consequentialist philosophy see supra pp. 178-81. 
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prohibition of the abortion right, 220 including prohibitions on the use 
of abortion for sex-selective purposes. 
1. Liberal Feminism and Issues of Moral Agency 
In large part, the failure of the legal system to ardently protect 
women's reproductive and abortion decisionmaking as equal protec­
tion issues stems from our cultural perception ofwomen as irresponsi­
ble moral agents who cannot be trusted with such important 
decisions. 221 This is evidenced by various state statutes, eventually 
held unconstitutional, regarding spousal consent and notification pro­
visions in abortion laws.222 Spousal consent and notification provi­
sions, as well as mandatory waiting periods in abortion laws, are 
symptomatic of a society that does not believe that pregnant women 
will make good choices concerning their fetuses.22s Such restrictions 
demonstrate the cultural assumption that women cannot make repro­
ductive decisions without the help or direction of men (or the State 
220. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Speaking in a judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. R:Ev. 
1185 (1992); Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Some TJwughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation 
to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. R:Ev. 375, 382-83, 386 (1985). 
221. See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Abortion Revisited, 66 N.Y.U. L. R:Ev. 1774, 
1820 (1991) (criminal abortion laws often reflect understanding ofwomen as incapa­
ble or irresponsible decisionmakers). This theme ofwoman as untrustworthy can also 
be seen in traditional rape laws. The definition of rape, the concept of consent, and 
the burden of proof are all examples of this concept. See Berger et al., The Dimensions 
ofRape Reform Legi,slation, 22 LAw & Soc'y R:Ev. 329 (1988) (images ofwomen as seduc­
tive and untrustworthy are, under traditional rape laws, combined with socio-legal 
conceptions of women as property of males, and produce a wide range of prejudicial 
criminal justice system practices in handling rape cases.) MacKinnon also offers some 
insight into the law's mistrust ofwomen and its male perspective of the law of rape. I 
think that the parallels to abortion law are clear. MacKinnon writes: 
It seems to me we have here a convergence between the rapist's view ofwhat 
he has done and the victim's perspective on what has been done to her... A 
rape victim has to prove that it was not intercourse. She has to show that 
there was force and she resisted, because if there was sex, consent was in­
ferred. Finders of fact look for 'more force than usual during the prelimina­
ries.' Rape is defined by the distinction from intercourse - not 
nonviolence, intercourse. They ask, does this event look more like fucking 
or like rape? But what is their standard for sex, and is this question asked 
from the woman '.s- point ofview? The level of force is not adjudicated at her 
point of violation, it is adjudicated at the standard of the normal level of 
force. Who sets this standar& 
MAcK!NNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 198, at 88 (emphasis added). 
222. See, e.g., Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Bellotti 
v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
223. In this context a good choice is one that both favors the status quo of patri­
archy and women's disempowerment and one that is morally responsible in the patri­
archal moral/ethical framework in which we currently operate. Thus, a good choice 
is one that does not threaten men's power or existence. Women could, if they had 
the power to make such a decision, abort men out of existence. But instead, because 
we lack real social, political or economic power, we are participating in our own 
annihilation. 
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conceptualized as male).224 Moral agency is, in this context, defined 
as autonomous decisionmaking. "Prohibiting abortion denigrates wo­
men as decisionmakers, and it reinforces their role as sexual objects 
by undermining their ability to act as sexual agents. It further reduces 
the limited power that women are allowed to exercise over their bod­
ies and their sexuality in our society."225 Feminists and other support­
ers of women's empowerment generally recognize that respect for all 
human beings requires that a woman's autonomy and individual 
moral responsibility be the standards that govern the final resolution 
of conflicts about reproduction and abortion.226 The more difficult 
question for feminists, and other like-minded folk, is whether, given 
the fact that most, ifnot all, of the fetuses aborted due to their sex are 
female, sex-selective abortion is nevertheless called for by the princi­
ples of individual dignity, liberty and autonomy. For liberal feminism, 
the balancing of harms must sway in favor of its foundational princi­
ples of the protection of liberty and autonomy. 
The refusal of society, through law, to protect and support wcr 
men's ability to make and carry out reproductive decisions, including 
a decision to abort a fetus because of its sex, also seems to derive from 
the deontological ethical consequences of the view that a fetus is a 
person, which equates the moral status of the fetus with the moral 
status of the pregnant woman.227 It is not that feminists believe that 
224. See, e.g., Law, Aborlion Compromise, supra note 76, at 940 (mandating waiting 
periods for abortion sends powerful message that women make rash decisions and are 
not competent moral decisionmakers); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, supra 
note 208, at 1035 (consent and notification requirements reflect contempt for women 
as law abiding citizens). 
. 225. Olsen, supra note 73, at 121. In fact some jurisdictions are beginning to 
prosecute women for alcohol and drug use during pregnancy. See, e.g., Johnson v. 
Florida, 602 So. 2d 1288 (1992) (Supreme Court overturned conviction of woman 
convicted of the delivery of a controlled substance to bapy through umbilical cord 
after birth). One California jurisdiction went so far as to charge a woman with child 
abuse and neglect for the death of her newborn baby because she failed to follow her 
physician's advice. Pamela Rae Stewart was charged in California via California Penal 
Code § 270, which was designed to punish the willful omission of "necessary clothing, 
food, shelter or medical attention." The allegations against Stewart were that in fail­
ing to follow her physician's advice, she contributed to her child's death. Her physi­
cian's advice included: abstaining from sexual intercourse and the active care of her 
two children, to maintain bed-rest, and to promptly report to the hospital when she 
observed vaginal bleeding. Jim Schacter, Woman Accused ofContributing to Baby~Demise 
During Pregnancy, Los ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 1, 1986, part II, at 1. Charges against Ms. 
Stewart were dismissed on a pre-trial motion on the grounds that the statute did not 
encompass the conduct alleged. Los ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 27, 1987, part I, at 3. But I 
think that the important fact to note is thatjurisdictions are trying to control women's 
bodies and sexuality through law. 
226. Fletcher, supra note 217, at 16. The Supreme Court recognized this princi­
ple in Tlurrnhurgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, where the Court 
reasoned that "[f]ew decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly pri­
vate, or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, that a woman's decision ... 
whether to end her pregnancy." Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772. · 
227. See discussion supra pp. 176-78. 
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the fetus is of no moral significance or consequence. Rather, most 
feminists believe that the fetus does not have any moral "rights" of its 
own. In contrast, feminists believe that women, undoubtedly, have 
full moral status. According to liberal philosophy, this status must in­
clude personal autonomy, if it is to have any meaning at all. Women's 
autonomy overides concerns about harm to the fetus. Because of the 
physical and emotional nature of pregnancy, the fetus' health and 
rights must be subordinate to the health and the rights of the woman 
carrying it. Treating the fetus as if it were the moral equal of a born 
person is intolerable because such treatment is also indicative of soci­
ety's sexism and its denigration of women: "Treating a fetus as mor­
ally equivalent to a child obscures the active role that mothers play in 
procreation and is yet another example of society's tendency to de­
value the work that mothers do."228 Pregnancy is a creative, emotional 
and physical process.229 The fetus is alive because the pregnant wo­
man, through gestation, has made it viable. Thus, even if fetuses are 
considered persons either morally230 or constitutionally, the compara­
tive moral status of the woman and the physical and emotional/ 
psychic nature of pregnancy may demand access to abortion for any 
reason the pregnant woman wishes, including sex-selection.231 
Support for liberal feminist opposition to prohibitions on sex-se­
lective abortion can also be found in Mary Anne Warren's pragmatic 
analysis of sex-selection where she argues from the principle of free­
dom of choice. As previously discussed, Warren asserts that the moral 
presumption regarding sex-selection should be in support of the free­
dom to choose "in the absence of powerful countervailing argu­
ments."232 The liberal feminist analysis, in focusing on the principles 
of autonomy and liberty, maintains that the harm of prohibitions is to 
the autonomy ofwomen in decisionmaking. The harm to women sug­
gested by the sociological evidence regarding sex-selection does not 
approach the sufficiency of harm necessary to override the liberty of 
the woman in her decisionmaking due to the indeterminacy of such 
predictions.233 
228. Olsen, supra note 73, at 121. 
229. RICH, supra note 75, at 21-40 (who discusses the psychological, physical, and 
emotional sufferings and crises of pregnancy and motherhood, and exposes the "insti­
tution" of motherhood as it exists under patriarchy as the ghettoization and degrada­
tion of female potentialities). 
230. There is much debate among theologians and ethicists regarding the moral 
status of the fetus. For an example of differing views see Flowers, supra note 74, at 246­
48; VATICAN, supra note 68. 
231. One commentator has suggested that restricting abortion or denying wo­
men independent decisionmaking in this area denies women the opportunity to act 
as moral agents. See Schmidt, supra note 205, at 621-23. 
232. WARREN, supra note 4, at 180. 
233. For a fuller analysis ofWarren's pragmatic method, see supra pp. 181-83 and 
corresponding footnotes. 
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Hence, a liberal feminist analysis of sex-selective abortion first 
recognizes, through analysis and adoption of consequentialist and 
pragmatic philosophic methods, that the consequences of any legal 
prohibition of sex-selective abortion would fail to legally recognize wo­
men as responsible moral agents, and that any such law would by im­
plication further the view that women cannot be trusted to make 
responsible decisions concerning reproduction. Under a liberal femi­
nist approach, all regulations and prohibitions surrounding preg­
nancy, abortion, and childbirth are issues of gender inequality. That 
is to say, it is a question ofwhether the State can permissibly discrimi­
nate against women and thereby maintain their subordinate legal sta­
tus. This analysis focuses on the authority of the pregnant woman, 
and the fact that a fetus is a part of a pregnant woman's body, and is 
nourished and sustained inside a woman's body; hence anything done 
for the benefit of the fetus is done to the pregnant woman.· Under a 
liberal feminist construction, the principle of liberty and autonomy 
and the legal philosophies of privacy and equal protection demand 
the legal protection ofwomen's decisionmaking in this arena, includ­
ing the decision to abort on the basis of fetal sex. This is not to as­
sume that future generations of women will not be disadvantaged 
socially, economically, or politically by sex-selective abortion, as the 
sociological data indicates. Rather, it is an acknowledgement of the 
current consequences of such restrictions - that women are also dis­
advantaged by laws which are founded on the notion of women's in­
ability to make responsible decisions and as a result severely curtail or 
prohibit women's self-determination. 
Given the full moral status ofwomen, the physical and emotional 
nature of pregnancy and childbirth, the ways in which a forced preg­
nancy is oppressive to women, and of course, the historical and cur­
rent oppression of women, abortion and sex-selective abortion still 
raise equal protection issues, regardless of the moral or legal status of 
the fetus. These are issues which ordinarily must be decided in favor · 
of women's rights to bodily integrity and self-determination: 
The differential burden that denying access to contraceptives im­
poses upon women is not a facially neutral policy having a disparate 
impact upon different groups of people - no man faces the physi­
cal risks of pregnancy. Even assuming that both parents bear equal 
responsibility for the child after birth, only women are confronted 
with the choice of obtaining an abortion or enduring the physical 
burdens of pregnancy.234 
A liberal feminist would assert that under either MacKinnon's 
and Law's analyses, any State regulation or prohibition of sex-selective 
abortion would be constitutionally impermissible. Under these analy­
ses, the regulation or prohibition would fail because jt "contributes to 
the maintenance of an underclass or a deprived position because of 
234. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, supra note 208, at 978. 
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gender status."235 Powerlessness and subordination accompany the 
inability to control reproduction and bodily integrity. Women would 
be forced to bear fetuses that they did not wish to bear. This would 
indeed contribute to the maintenance of women's second class status 
due to their reproductive capacity, which is, of course, gender status. 
v. TOWARD A RADICAL ANALYSIS OF SEX-SELECTIVE ABORTION: THE 
NECESSI'IY OF FEMINIST VISION 
What does it mean when the tools of a racist patriarchy are used to examine 
the fruits of that same patriarchy? It means that only the most narrow 
perimeters of change are possible and allowable. . . . For the master's tools 
will never dismantle the master's house. They may allow us temporarily to 
beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us to bring about 
genuine change. 
- Audre Lorde, The Masters Tools Will Never 
Dismantle The Master's House ( 1984) 
Arguments in favor of liberty, autonomy in decisionmaking, and 
self-determination for women in the reproductive sphere are legally 
and morally compelling. The constitutional right to safe and legal 
abortion was fought for by many women on these grounds. On the 
other hand, the critical legal studies and feminist movements have 
taught us that this ideology of liberty has, on numerous occasions, 
deflected our attention from the investigation of reproductive tech­
nology as an institution of patriarchy.236 The focus on individual 
rights has allowed us to neglect larger issues of social need and 
justice.237 
235. CATHARINE MAcKINNON, SEXUAL lIARAssMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, supra 
note 205, at 117. 
236. As Janice Raymond has noted: 
[T]his ideology prevents us from examining technological and contractual 
reproduction as an institution and leads us to neglect the conditions that 
create industrialized breeding and the role that it plays in society. Choice so 
dominates the discussion that when critics of technological reproduction de­
nounce the ways in which women are abused by these procedures, we are 
accused of making women into victims and, supposedly, of denying that wo­
men are capable of choice. To expose victimization of women is to be 
blamed for creating women as victims. 
RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS, supra note 15, at x; see also MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASS­
MENT, supra note 205, at 99. 
237. This of course is the critical legal studies critique of rights. Critical legal 
theorists assert that rights talk is harmful because when rights are balanced against 
vital social issues of need, the emphasis on the importance of individual rights creates 
conditions where social needs are continuously ignored. See, e.g., UNGER, supra note 
195, at 597; Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1 
(1984) (pursuit of rights is foolish and misled); Peter Gabel, The Phenomenowgj of 
Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1563, 1582 
(1984). For a fuller explanation and critique of the critical legal studies view of rights, 
see Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic ofRights and Politics, supra note 200, at 593­
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Radical feminist legal theory also offers a critique of classic indi­
vidualism and rights-talk. The radical feminist analysis ofwomen's op­
pression focuses on .the existence of patriarchy as a system of 
comprehensive power and authority under the control of men. 
Through entrenched systems of racism and classism, these men, some­
what successfully, dominate and control other men of different races 
and men oflower economic status. As AlisonJaggar has noted in her 
analysis of radical feminism, radical feminists believe that in order to 
legitimize the domination of others, white male culture "invents ideol­
ogies that define subordinate groups as inferior for one reason or an­
other: as lazy, shiftless, stupid, greedy, emotional, sly, childish, 
barbaric, or uncultured. Under patriarchy, many of these attributes 
are applied to women as well as to subordinated groups not defined 
primarily by sex. "23B 
Also central to radical feminism is the understanding that women 
are oppressed in ways that are directly related to their gendered status 
as women. Through systems ofgender oppression, men dominate wo­
men. Women under patriarchy are viewed as human beings whose 
most important role is that ofmother and caretaker: to have and raise 
children and to satisfy the sexual and emotional needs of men. As 
MacKinnon has explained regarding the importance ofwomen's sexu­
ality to patriarchy: 
Ifwomen are socially defined such that female sexuality cannot be 
lived or spoken or felt or even somatically sensed apart from its en­
forced definition, so that it is its own lack, then there is no such 
thing as a woman as such, there are only walking embodiments of 
men's projected needs. For feminism, asking whether there is, so­
cially, a female sexuality is the same as asking whether women 
exist.239 
In addition, "[t]his ideology limits what women may do under patri­
archy and delegitimizes whatever they in fact do that goes beyond the 
limits of the patriarchal definition."240 Hence radical feminism often 
96. But even Duncan Kennedy acknowledges that rights claims should not be com­
pletely abandoned: 
[T]he critique of rights as liberal philosophy does not imply that the left 
should abandon rights rhetoric as a tool of political organizing or legal argu­
ment. Embedded in the rights notion is a liberating accomplishment of our 
culture: the affirmation offree human subjectivity against the constraints of 
group life, along with the paradoxical countervision of a group life that cre­
ates and nurtures individuals capable of freedom. We need to work at the 
slow transformation of rights rhetoric, at dereifying it, rather than simply 
junking it. 
Duncan Kennedy, Critical Lahar Law Theory: A Comment, 4 INDUS. REL. LJ. 503, 506 
(1980-81). 
238. AusoN M.JAGGAR, FEMINIST PoLITics AND HUMAN NATURE 255 (1988). 
239. Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda 
for Theory, 7(3) SIGNS 515 (1982). 
240. JAGGAR, supra note 238, at 255. 
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focuses on the gender domination of women in the institutions of 
motherhood and family, as well as the gender domination ofwomen's 
sexuality and reproductive capabilities - all ofwhich are maintained 
and enforced through social and legal structures. 241 This theory of 
the male domination of women through family institutions has been 
extended to include an analysis of the state: an institutional surrogate 
for male control of women inside and outside of the family.242 
Many radical feminists are critical of rights-talk due to its justifica­
tions of state power based on the enforcement of individual rights. 243 
Rights and claims to rights are part of the patriarchal system of law 
which is represented by the belief in the importance of objectivity, 
distance and abstraction.244 "Abstract rights", according to MacKin­
non, "authorize the male experience of the world,"245 and as a result, 
rights-talk tends to delegitimize women's experience of the world, 
such as their treatment under the law governing reproductive technol­
ogies, and the importance ofwomen's material needs.246 As one radi­
cal feminist scholar and activist noted: "It is from rights-thinking that 
we get that curious abstraction of the fetus without a womb. Sooner 
241. Radical feminism has been historically criticized by many feminists, particu­
larly feminist and other women of color for its proclivity to universalize the experi­
ence of white women as the experience of all women, ignoring differences of race, 
class, and ethnicity among women, and the separation of its understanding of patri­
archy from ·other features of the political economy. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race 
and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990). But see Susan 
Christian, Woman (Modified), 4 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 171 (1991) ("A perspective de­
fined by a focus upon a form of inequality which affects all women, albeit in different 
ways depending on our characteristics and resources, is not inherently 'essential­
ist.'"); e. christi cunningham, Unmaddening: A Response to Angela Harris, 4 YALEJ.L. & 
FEMINISM 155 (1991) ("MacKinnon cannot define Black women, but in deconstruct­
ing male definitions that have been imposed on women, she creates space for new 
definitions."). 
242. See, e.g., MAcK!NNON, TowARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 
110, at 170; Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique ofRights Analysis, 63 TEX. 
L. REv. 387, 400 (1984); cf. Siegel, supra note 200, at 377 (abortion restrictions coerce 
women to perform the work of motherhood without altering the conditions that 
make such work a principal cause of women's secondary status). For a brief history 
and analysis of radical feminism, see al,so MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGUIATION OF THE LIVES 
OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PREsENT 22-24 
(1988); jAGGAR, supra note 238, at 249-302. See al,so FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDA­
TIONS (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993). 
243. See, e.g., RAYMOND, supra note 15, at 191. 
244. See Schneider, The Dialectic ofRights and Politics, supra note 200, at 597, 600. 
245. Catharine A MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward 
Feminist jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 658 (1983); see al,so id., at 644-45;Janet Rifkin, To­
ward a Theory ofLaw and Patriarchy, 3 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 83 (1980). 
246. See also John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp and Fire Music 
Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2129, 
2215 (1992) ("Th[e] process whereby rights are defined by law, however, is substan­
tially isolated from the very needs that generated those rights and the values they 
envisaged."). 
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or later we have to expose rights-based perspectives ... for what they 
are: a poorly disguised way of preserving things just as they are."247 
Although rights-talk can divert political vision and discourse from 
issues of group oppression by reinforcing individualism, for many, 
rights and rights-talk fills an important social need. AB critical race 
scholar Patricia Williams has explained regarding African-Americans: 
"For the historically disempowered, the conferring of rights is sym­
bolic of all of the denied aspects of their humanity: rights imply a 
respect that places one in the referential range of self and others, that 
elevates one's status from human body to social being."248 Williams 
also explains that: "The vocabulary of rights speaks to an establish­
ment that values the guise of stability, and from whom social change 
for the better must come (whether it is given, taken, or smuggled)."249 
Furthermore, historically, the assertion of needs, in addition to the 
assertion of rights, or in place of the assertion of rights, as advocated 
by critical legal studies scholars, has been unsuccessful for disen­
franchised groups in our society. Again, Williams notes: "For blacks, 
describing needs has been a dismal failure as political activity .... The 
history of our need is certainly moving enough to have been called 
poetry, oratory and epic entertainment - but it has never been 
treated by white institutions as a statement of political priority."250 AB 
a result of these observations, critical race theorists, as well as other 
scholars of color, have encouraged the fight for rights. Rights, they 
have found, serve a dual purpose. Rights "facilitate our access to a 
variety of legal norms and enforcement mechanisms by which we try 
to indicate ... important claims."251 Rights rhetoric and ideology are 
also useful "to mobilize support for a particular agenda."252 AB John 
Calmore observes: "Until the subjugated group feels a sense of moral 
outrage, the group will almost certainly fail to resist the injustice that 
is oppressing it. "253 Hence, although rights-talk can be liberating as 
well as alienating for the disenfranchised,254 the enhancement of 
rights' liberatory potential is at the heart of critical race theory. Many 
feminists have agreed with Williams, Calmore, and other critical race 
theorists on these points, asserting that rights and rights-talk have pos­
247. RAYMOND, supra note 15, at 191 (quoting Sherene Razack, Wrong Rights: Fem­
inism Applied to Law, 10 LE BUil.ETIN I NEwSLETIER, !NSIITUT SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR 13 
(1990)). 
248. PATRICIA]. Wll.LIAMs, ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAw PROFES­
SOR 153 (1991). As Raymond notes, the movement from body to social being is also 
relevant in women's struggle for reproductive justice. See RAYMOND, supra note 15, at 
192. 
249. Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed 
Rights, 22 HARv. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 401, 410 (1987). 
250. Id. at 412. 
251. Calmore, supra note 246, at 2211. 
252. Id. 
253. Id. (footnote omitted). 
254. See Roberts, supra note 153, at 591. 
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itive value. Elizabeth M. Schneider has noted that critical legal theo­
rists as well as feminist theorists opposed to rights-talk "see only the 
limits of rights, and fail to appreciate the dual possibilities of rights 
discourse.... [Rights discourse] can help to affirm human values, 
enhance political growth, and assist in the development of collective 
identity."255 For example, rights have historically helped to move the 
nation's thinking and actions along regarding some matters of civil 
rights and racial justice. Rights have also empowered women as a so­
cial group by giving some women power, although limited, over 
whether and when they choose motherhood. 
Even in light of the criticism placed on the value of rights in our 
society, rights and rights discourse have been, and will continue to be, 
useful to disenfranchised groups in our struggle for a just society. 
Rights-talk speaks to the interpretive community. It speaks in the lan­
guage of those who hold power.256 In order for any dissenting view to 
be seriously considered in legal discourse, those in control must un­
derstand the claims of the dispossessed and take those claims seri­
ously. Nevertheless, individual rights are the "tools of a racist 
patriarchy," to use Audre Lorde's metaphor, and "will never dismantle 
the master's house."257 While rights discourse, as currently framed by 
liberalism, permits reform, it will never allow the destruction of patri­
archy and hence will never allow the radical changes needed to truly 
transform women's social and political status. 
A. 	 Another Way to Think about llights: Transfomiing Feminist 
Consciousness 
Feminism must mean something more than liberalism for wo­
men. Feminism becomes impoverished liberalism if its only·meaning 
is "anything goes." 
When a woman's right to do whatever she wants to her body is valo­
rized as feminism, feminism is stripped of its collective content and 
becomes little more than an individual woman's ability to adopt her­
self to the bourgeois image of the self-centered man.258 
Rights, too, become meaningless when they are not used as a tool to 
advance social justice. Rights, as we have seen in various civil rights 
contexts, can assist in the diminution of subordination. But rights 
and rights rhetoric can only be useful if they are not separated from 
issues of social justice and other ethical concerns. Therefore, in order 
to ethically support rights in the reproductive arena, feminists must 
255. Schneider, Dialectic ofRights and Politics, supra note 200, at 597-98. 
256. Cf Carol Rose, Possession as the Origin ofProperty, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 73, 84-85, 
88 (1985) (common law theory of possession gives preference to those who articulate 
their intentions in a specific vocabulary and in a structure that is approved of and 
understood by those in power). 
257. Audre Lorde, The Masters Tools will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in SIS­
TER OUTSIDER 110-13 (1984). 
258. 	RAYMOND, supra note 15, at 194. 
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seek to ensure that the rights sought do not create new forms of sub­
ordination for women of any race or class, or for members of other 
subordinated groups.259 Feminism must consider whether the right 
to choose abortion, as it is currently framed by liberalism, increases 
women's reproductive freedom or increases the exploitation of wo­
men's reproductive capacities. It must consider the ways in which re­
productive technologies, like sex-selective abortion, will affect the 
value or status ofwomen in this gender-based society. Even many fem­
inists who have argued against the legal regulation of sex-selective 
abortion have recognized that the principle of freedom of choice 
must be secondary to the principles of social fairness and equal pro­
tection if women's subordination is to be reduced or eradicated.260 
There must be a point at which the rights of individual women im­
pinge so strongly on women as a social group that social or legal regu­
lation is required. 261 Therefore, if rights-talk is to be a useful tool of 
feminist discourse in this area, freedom of choice must be weighed 
against the commitment to ending subordination.262 In the final anal­
ysis, rights discourse must include an understanding of the historical 
and contemporary injustices towards women, as well as an understand­
ing of women's social training in patriarchy which often requires wo­
men to collude with patriarchy to their own disadvantage. 
For example, when considering issues of substantive justice and 
their connection to ethical considerations, we must consider whether 
rights-talk fully considers the social, economic and political contexts 
in which women make "choices" concerning the abortion ofgendered 
(female) fetuses. In bringing attention to the context of these 
choices, I am not arguing that women cannot make moral choices 
under conditions of oppression. Women, like other subordinated 
groups, are always forced into double-bind choices: "situations in 
which options are reduced to a very few and all of them expose one to 
penalty, censure or deprivation."263 
In the context of sex-selective abortion, women are forced to 
make double-bind choices. The choices for a woman, once she knows 
the sex of her female fetus, are few. A woman can choose to abort the 
female fetus because of its sex for any of several reasons. There may 
be familial pressures for her to produce male children. She may con­
259. Cf. Matsuda, supra note 105, at 1771. 
260. See, e.g., Powledge, supra note 71; Roberta Steinbacher & Helen B. Holmes, 
Sex Choice: Survival and Sisterhood, in MAN-MADE WOMEN, supra note 25, at 52, 61. 
261. See Rowland, supra note 25, at 84. 
262. Several feminist and critical race scholars have stressed the importance of 
an anti-subordination prinicple in the quest for equality, and in their critique of lib­
eral rights-talk. See, e.g., MAcK!NNON, TowARD AFEMINisr THEORY OF THE STATE, supra 
note 110, at 215-34; Mari]. Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting 
Seeds in Plowed Up Ground, 11 HARv. WOMEN'S LJ. 1 (1988); Ruth Colker, Anti.Subordi­
nation Above All: Sex, Race and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003 (1986). 
263. Marilyn Frye, oppression, in THE PoLITics OF REALnY: ESSAYS IN FEMINisr 
THEORY 1, 2 (1983). 
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sider the cultural denigration of women and girls; she knows that her 
daughter's life will be difficult as a woman because of the social, eco­
nomic, and political obstacles under patriarchy. Or she may have her 
own preference for male children, which is also culturally pro­
duced.264 If the woman chooses not to abort the female fetus, she 
may face, at the very least, the disappointment and ridicule of her 
family, especially if she doesn't have any male children already. She 
may also face pressure to have additional children so that perhaps she 
will be "lucky enough" to have a boy. In some circumstances, the wo­
man may face death or divorce; her daughter may face a life of dis­
criminatory treatment in education and employment, as well as 
discrimination in access to health care and nutrition. 
On the other hand, the choices for a woman, once she knows the 
sex of her male fetus, are similiarly constrained. A woman who elects 
to abort the male fetus because of its sex, based on her desire to raise 
female children, may be viewed with scorn by her partner and her 
family. She may be viewed as foolish and imprudent under the best 
circumstances. Under the worst circumstances, she may face divorce 
or death. If she decides not to have or raise male children, as a 
method of non-participation in her own oppression, she challenges 
patriarchical political and social institutions. Her refusal to support 
patriarchy by having male children can be understood as a form of the 
pragmatic social criticism to which Corne! West refers.265 The woman 
who aborts a male fetus because of its gender may indeed be commit­
ting a revolutionary act. 266 But like the decision not to abort a female 
fetus, the decision to abort a male fetus may have dire social conse­
quences for the pregnant woman. 
Being in this double-bind means that the choices of a pregnant 
woman with an engendered fetus are restrained and conditioned by 
the tenets of patriarchy which devalue the lives of women and girls. 
The patriarchal values at work here are "not accidental or occasional 
and hence avoidable, but are systematically related to each other in 
such a way as to catch one (ie. woman) between and among them and 
restrict or penalize motion in any direction."267 Therefore, I am not 
asserting that women are incapable of making positive choices within 
the contexts of powerlessness and vulnerability. Women are forced to 
make double-bind choices all of the time. However, where women's 
lives are so devalued by society, how much value do those choices have 
when made from a position ofsubordination and powerlessness? How 
much value do those choices have when they may ultimately increase 
264. Id. at 14 ("[m]any of the restrictions and limitations we live with are more 
or less internalized and self-monitored, and are part of our adaptation to the require­
ments and expectations imposed by the needs and tastes and tyrannies of others."). 
Cf RAYMOND, supra note 15, at 99, 100. 
265. See supra note 113. 
266. Id. 
267. FRYE, supra note 263, at 4. 
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the subordination and vulnerability ofwomen? In other words, by val­
uing "choice" in this context, do we minimize or devalue the discrimi­
nation and powerlessness that women face under patriarchal systems? 
Catharine MacKinnon, in explaining why sex-selective abortion 
should not be permitted in the context of patriarchy, has written: 
[I]n a context of mass abortions of female fetuses, the pressures on 
women to destroy potential female offfspring are tremendous and 
oppressive unless restrictions exist. While under conditions of sex 
inequality monitoring women's reasons for deciding to abort is wor­
rying, the decision is not a free one, even absent governmental in­
tervention, where a male life is valued and a female life is not. 268 
I believe that the importance of this context is what Cornel West is 
referring to when he talks about the necessity of prophetic pragma­
tism and pragmatism as political theoiy.269 
Many reproductive rights, such as the right to buy and use contra­
ception and the right to choose abortion, gave women with economic 
resources power and control over their lives. These rights allowed wo­
men to choose whether or when to have children. Women with finan­
cial resources no longer had to continue unplanned pregnancies or 
have back-alley abortions.270 Sex-selective abortion is different be­
cause its consequences do not lie in the dismantling of patriarchal 
domination. We have seen that the overwhelming majority ofwomen 
who make choices regarding sex-selective abortion make the choice to 
destroy the female fetus. Thus, while abortion gives women control 
over whether or when to have children, sex-selective abortion gives 
men (husbands and families) 271 greater influence over women's repro­
duction and the sexual composition of future generations. Sex-selec­
tive abortion also increases the possibilities of expanded 
discrimination of women based on gender. 272 Instead of eliminating 
the subordination ofwomen and girls, sex-selective abortion increases 
women's social, economic, political and reproductive exploitation. It 
makes women vulnerable to a new set of pressures by giving prospec­
tive moral status to the fetus she carries. 
The current use of sex-selective abortion is based on patterns of 
male preference and female subordination. In viewing the use of the 
technology from a radical feminist and modified pragmatic position, 
support for the selective abortion offemale fetuses is impossible. Sex­
268. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, supra note 200, at 1317 
n.157. 
269. West, The Limits ofNeopragmatism, supra note 92; and WEST, THE AMERICAN 
EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 106. 
270. Because of the severe limitations on federal funding for abortion, many 
poor women have been forced to continue unplanned pregnancies or have abortions 
performed by unlicensed providers. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (Hyde 
Amendment, which restricts federal funding for most abortions for poor women, held 
constitutional). 
271. LERNER, supra note 49 (The nuclear family is an institution of patriarchy). 
272. See supra pp. 173-75 and accompanying notes. 
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selective abortion, if available on a large scale, would be used to vic­
timize women and girls both individually and as a social group, serv­
ing to disempower women and continue their subordination. Sex­
selective abortion used under patriarchy strengthens patriarchy. This 
result is in direct opposition to the tenets and goals of feminism and 
modified pragmatism used as political theory. 
B. The Possibility of a Feminist Solution 
The question remains: Do we prohibit the practice of the selec­
tive abortion of female fetuses in light of the precariousness of wo­
men's reproductive rights? 
As previously noted, constitutional abortion jurisprudence would 
seem to allow the State to restrict abortion for the purpose of sex­
selection. Under the constitutional test articulated in Casey, a state 
regulation burdening the abortion decision would be unconstitu­
tional only if the regulation were unduly burdensome.273 In other 
words, the State may not severely limit access to legal abortion. Under 
the Casey rationale, the state could "express (its) profound respect for 
the life of the (fetus),"274 encourage childbirth over abortion,275 or 
even express its commitment to sex equality and prohibit the selective 
abortion of female fetuses.276 Under the rationales found in Casey 
and Rust, the state might be able to constitutionally limit a pregnant 
woman's access to the sex identification information of her fetus, if 
such a regulation is designed to persuade women to choose childbirth 
over abortion,277 or designed to foster the non-subordination of wo­
men and girls, and if the regulation does not have a severe impact on 
the availability of legal abortion.278 In either of the above scenarios, 
the woman seeking an abortion for the purpose of sex-selection would 
still have access to legal abortion; she would only be unable to factor 
the sex of her fetus into the decision.279 
Despite the possible constitutionality of a prohibition of sex-selec­
tive abortion, feminist scholars have refused to support law reform 
measures which would restrict a woman's right to choose abortion on 
any grounds, because such restrictions would be anathema to the 
goals and aspirations of the women's movement.280 Many feminist 
scholars who have approached the problem of sex-selective abortion 
have argued that legal prohibition of sex-selective abortion is politi­
273. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820. 
274. Id. at 2821. 
275. Id. at 2824. 
276. Note, however, that the courts have been reluctant to use fundamental 
rights to promote equality. See, e.g., American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 
323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 
277. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2824. 
278. See supra pp. 190-201 for a discussion of Casey. 
279. Cf. Schedler, supra note 10, at 328-30. 
280. See, e.g., Powledge, supra note 13; Renteln, supra note 30, at 421. 
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cally imprudent, given the precarious nature ofwomen's reproductive 
rights in this country and around the globe. Many of these scholars 
believe that if it becomes legally permissible or required for the state 
or the medical establishment to question women's judgment regard­
ing the abortion decision, the very foundation of women's reproduc­
tive freedom will be shattered, and women will be subject to increased 
scrutiny over all reproductive decisions, furthering the subordination 
ofwomen.281 Thus, they argue, any restrictions on abortion are insup­
portable in the present context. In addition, many scholars con­
cerned about the impact of the selective abortion of female fetuses on 
the status ofwomen have argued against legal prohibition of the abor­
tion and in favor of informal social deterrence. Some of these schol­
ars have advocated deterrence by encouraging doctors and genetic 
counselors to intentionally withhold information regarding fetal sex 
except in the context of sex-linked diseases. 282 Others have suggested 
a program of social deterrence that would eliminate funding for sex­
selection research. 283 Still other feminist scholars have suggested that 
the proper way to combat the problem ofsex-selection is through con­
sciousness-raising.284 
While some forms of social deterrence and consciousness-raising 
may be important components of a feminist and modified pragmatic 
approach to the problem of the selective abortion of female fetuses, 
there has been little feminist exploration regarding why and whether 
legal control of the knowledge of fetal sex is appropriate.285 Dorothy 
Roberts is one scholar who has considered restrictions on the access to 
information in the abortion context. With regard to the "gag" rule at 
281. Wertz & Fletcher, supra note 35, at 26. 
282. See, e.g., John C. Fletcher & Dorothy C. Wertz, Genetics and the Law: Ethic, 
Law, and Medical Genetics: After the Human Genome is Mapped, 39 EMORYLJ. 747, 789-90 
(1990) (law prohibiting abortion for sex-selection appropriate only where there is 
evidence of abuse; where no abuse, legal prohibition may set harmful precedents re­
stricting abortion choices); Wertz & Fletcher, supra note 35. 
283. Powledge, supra note 13, at 208-09. 
284. See, e.g., Renteln, supra note 30, at 422. Consciousness-raising, "the collec­
tive critical reconstitution of the meaning of women's social experience, as women 
live through it," has been an important feminist political tool in that it has helped 
women to name their oppression and develop tools to fight their oppression within 
themselves (internalized oppression), as well as against their oppressors. MAcK!NNoN, 
TowARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 110, at 83; see Schneider, The 
Dialectic of Rights and Politics, supra note 200, at 602-03. In this way, consciousness­
raising is both educative and a form of political practice and resistance. Therefore it 
seems quite clear that consciousness-raising can be an important tool in the develop­
ment of feminist discourse in the area of sex-selective abortion of female fetuses. As 
Alison Renteln has noted, "it is necessary to challenge those who consciously endorse 
the tenets and goals of the women's movement but who still exhibit the desire for 
firstborn male; why is this so? . . . Only through consciousness raising will women 
come to value themselves and their daughters." Renteln, supra note 30, at 422. 
285. Schedler argues that a prohibition on access to fetal sex information is con­
stitutionally permissible. See Schedler, supra note 10, at 311-28. 
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issue in Rust v. Sullivan,286 which prohibited doctors and others work­
ing at federally funded health care clinics from giving pregnant wo­
men information about abortion and abortion services, Roberts notes 
that the regulations at issue banned information that was vital to poor 
women's "well-being, autonomy, and participation in the commu­
nity."287 Roberts concludes that by intentionally fostering ignorance 
among poor black women, these regulations "are an example of the 
control of knowledge that helps to maintain the existing structure of 
racial domination."288 The denial of reproductive freedom has been a 
principal means of subjugating Black women in the United States.289 
The denial of information about abortion denied poor Black women 
the knowledge necessary to control their lives and hence was part of 
that continued subordination and subjugation. 
Whether and how Roberts' analysis of the control of knowledge 
bears upon the problem of sex-selective abortion is not self-evident. 
Would the denial of information regarding fetal sex deny women the 
knowledge necessary to control their lives? Without access to fetal sex 
information, women will still be able to access legal abortion. Addi­
tionally, denying women the opportunity to choose male children has 
not historically been a means of gender oppression, butjust the oppo­
site: Son preference has been one method of gender oppression in 
patriarchal systems. Limiting sex identification information might in 
fact circumscribe some of the oppression faced by women. Unlike the 
restriction of information at issue in Rust, which supported existing 
social arrangements,290 a restriction on access to fetal sex information 
may permit the oppressed to take steps to change their status.291 
Again, such a restriction would act as a social criticism of a system 
where the institutionalization of misogyny is so great that we must act 
in such a radical manner. A restriction on fetal sex information chal­
lenges the social and political arrangements that have harmed women 
of all races in the United States. 
CONCLUSION 
The issue of abortion is often framed as a feminist issue of choice 
and respect for women's bodily and moral integrity. Many feminists 
have opposed the legal regulation of sex-selective abortion on these 
terms without sufficient regard for negative sociological predictions, 
the meaning for women of the abortion of almost exclusively female 
fetuses, and the possibility that rights are limiting as a liberatory prac­
tice. Individual rights in the reproductive context are often devoid of 
286. See discussion regarding Rust v. Sullivan, supra pp. 194-96. 
287. Roberts, supra note 153, at 616. 
288. Id. 
289. Id. at 641; see also DAVIS, supra note 24. 
290. Roberts, supra note 153, at 618. 
291. See id. at 617. 
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substantive justice. The effects of an individual woman's right to use 
sex-selective abortion goes beyond herself and can augment the op­
pression that she and other women ultimately face. Moving away from 
a liberal conception of rights and insisting that rights theory and prac­
tice embrace substantive justice and other ethical concerns allows a 
shift from the conception of reproductive decisions as based on indi­
vidual choice to a practice of rights that sufficiently considers group 
harm, and permits a critique of current social arrangements that en­
courage and sometimes require women to actively participate in their 
own annihilation. The resulting social outcomes are no longer 
subordinated to "process neutrality" but rather informed by substan­
tive justice. As a result, the importance of individual choice or prefer­
ence to the question of the permissibility of sex-selective abortion 
becomes secondary to the issue of substantive justice for women as a 
social group. Because the current use of sex-selective abortion is 
based on patterns of male preference and female subordination, and 
because of the deleterious social consequences of sex-selective abor­
tion for women, a restriction on the availability of fetal sex informa­
tion is warranted under this modified pragmatic and feminist 
framework. The right to choose does not necessarily facilitate liberty; 
choosing justice does. 
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